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I. INTRODUCTION

In the fall of 1993, as the debate over President Clinton's health care reform
bill heated up, the Health Insurance Association of America (HIAA) launched a
series of advertisements featuring the infamous "Harry and Louise." In one ad, the
young couple, seated around a breakfast table, denigrated the White House's health
care reform plan, stating "there's got to be a better way."' Unrelated to a specific
election or candidate, and instead focused on a single policy dispute, the $6.5
million campaign marked a new trend in political advertising: the use of an "issue
ad" to sway policy decisions. The ads sparked a national debate, as Democrats
publicly lambasted the advertisement as misleading, the Democratic National

Committee (DNC) launched its own ad attacking the anti-reform position,' as did
an advocacy group which supported the reform effort? In the end, the opposing
sides reached a truce, but the reform effort failed
Despite complaints about their accuracy and their uncertain role in the
ultimate demise of Clinton's health care legislation.' the health care ad campaigns
I

Health Care Reform Debate Squeezed into TVAds, THE ATLANTA J. & CONST., Oct. 23,

1993, at Al1. See also Elizabeth Kolbert, The Ad Campaign; Playing on UncertaintiesAbout the
Health Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1993, at A20; Elizabeth Kolbert, New Arenafor CampaignAds:
Health Care,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1993, at Al.
2

See Catherine S. Manegold, Reform Ads Rule Airwaves, SuN. GAZETTE MAIL, July 17, 1994,

at 1 A; InsurersAskClinton to Help Stop Ads, Associated Press, N.Y TIMES, March 11, 1994, at A20.
See Mary Jane Fisher, Administration, HIAA Stake Out Common Ground, NAT'L
UNDERWRITER, PROP. & CASUALTY/RISK & BENEFITS MGMT. ED., Mar. 21, 1994, at 1.
3

The reform plan died a slow death. See, e.g., Adam Clymer, CongressionalCompromise;
Clinton'sHealth Plan: Not as Deadas it Looks, N.Y. TIMES, March 27, 1994, at § 4, 3; Robin Toner,
Strain Shows in Committees on HealthBill, N.Y. TIMEs, June 16, 1994, at A24; Monica Borkowski,
The HealthCare Debate: Chronology;High Fever to No Pulse,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1994, at B10.
4

5
A telephone poll taken in September and October of 1993 found a mixed reaction to the ads.
Seventy-five percent of respondents had no definitive reaction to the ads; twenty-one percent said the
advertisements made them more likely to believe major changes were necessary, while two percent said
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illustrated how issue advocacy can enrich the discussion over important policy
questions by bringing that discussion into the public eye. First, the focus on issues
provided a positive contrast to the personal snipes and vacuous rhetoric of many
political debates or advertisements.
Moreover, the public discussion of
contradictory views provided the American people with a more exposed airing of
issues at stake than is afforded by the usual beltway monopoly over policy
questions. And rather than backroom handshakes between interest group and
politician, the campaign brought the lobbying process into the public forum,
effecting political change at a level far closer to the grass roots than the customary
form of influence: direct financial contributions to political candidates. In short, at
the very least, communications like the health care reform ads comprise important
forms of expression under either the "marketplace of ideas" or self-governance7
rationales for the First Amendment. Practically, such ads may serve as a healthy
supplemental forum in which to air important policy debates from NATO expansion
to trade policy.
As the 1996 Presidential and Congressional campaigns unfolded, a different
type of "issue advertisement" hit the American airwaves. This Article will show that
rather than addressing a specific policy debate, these ads possessed all the attributes
of a candidate's campaign advertisements. They expressly identified and criticized
vulnerable candidates in tightly contested districts or states and only shallowly
discussed issues, if at all. In some cases these ads were designed by candidates and
campaign staffs themselves, and often they were organized by national or state
political parties that had worked closely with candidates. Others were aired by
independent groups which were intimate with particular candidates and had publicly
vowed to influence the upcoming election. Despite their apparent dissimilarity from
the FHIAA ads of 1994, these ads were cast under the same definition and restrictionless status provided by current campaign finance law.
Although the Supreme Court and lawmakers have in the past attempted to
establish standards distinguishing between the two types of advertisements
described above, this Article will argue that those standards are ineffective because

they were less likely to believe major change was needed.

ROPER CTR. AT THE UNIV. OF CONN., PUB.

OPINION ONLINE, (March 18, 1994), available in LEXIS, Market Library, RPOLL File.
6

See generally Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)

("[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the

market.... ."); JOHN STUART

MILL, ON LIBERTY

(1859) (arguing that freedom of expression bolsters

the search for truth).
See generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF(1948) (arguing that the central purpose ofthe First Amendment is to further the process
of self-governance by providing for unrestricted discussion of public issues).
7

GOVERNMENT
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they fail to take into account the realities of political advertising and campaigning.
While the Court and lawmakers have correctly identified the potential benefits of
true issue advocacy, campaign finance laws as they are now applied and interpreted
do not frame issue advocacy in a way that safeguards those benefits while avoiding
its potential dangers. The inadequacy of the current distinguishing standards
introduces numerous problems into the campaign finance system and defies the
Court's own careful measures upholding many aspects of campaign finance
regulation.
Part II of this Article traces the current legal standards defining issue
advocacy, analyzing the few cases in which the Court has addressed issue advocacy
and specifically examining the two prongs used to set issue advocacy apart from
campaign expenditures which can be regulated: express advocacy and coordination.
Part III describes the development of issue ads in politics, focusing on the 1996
elections. More specifically, this discussion shows how and explains why the
current prongs fail to encompass ads that are clear campaign ads. Part IV describes
how these flaws introduce a gaping loophole around current campaign finance laws
and will explain the threats to the system that this loophole creates. Part V
recommends and justifies new standards for issue ads that account for the realities
of political campaigning, and, in doing so, preserve issue ads' positive role while
eliminating the negative consequences they can render. Similar standards have been
proffered recently by the Federal Election Commission (FEC), as well as by the
judicial and Congressional branches, but have yet to gain hold in the law. If
Congress and the Court are to avoid the very dangers to the campaign system that
the Court itself has deemed compelling in recent decades, then both branches must
promulgate and support some version of these new standards in the near future.
II. ISSUE ADVOCACY: THE RATIONALE AND THE STANDARDS

A.

ProtectingIndependentIssue Advocacy: The Court'sRationale

In Buckley v. Valeo 'and FederalElection Commission v. Massachusetts
Citizensfor Life, Inc.(MCFL)Y the Court permitted regulation of campaign-related
communications and expenditures involving "express advocacy," while granting
independent issue advocacy full freedom from government regulation. In doing so,
the Court provided both Constitutional and practical justifications why independent

424 U.S. 1 (1976).
479 U.S. 238 (1986).
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issue advocacy merits protected status while other forms of political expression may
be regulated.

In Buckley, the Court declared that all regulations impinging political
expression -whether general policy discussion or advocacy for a particular political

result- burden "core First Amendment rights of political expression," and therefore
require the most rigid scrutiny."

Only regulations that are narrowly tailored to

serve a compelling government interest can withstand such scrutiny." Having set
forth this fundamental principle, the Court made two moves whose result was the
full protection of independent issue advocacy from campaign finance regulation.
First, while the Court recognized the prevention of real or apparent
corruption as a compelling interest justifying limits on campaign contributions, 2 it
found that independent expenditures could not be regulated in this way because they
pose little danger of corruption. 3 Next, citing several compelling interests, the

10

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45-46, 79. The Court elaborated on the importance of protecting

political expression. "[T]he First Amendment right to 'speak one's mind.., on all public institutions'
includes the right to engage in 'vigorous advocacy no less than abstract discussion."' Id. at 48 (quoting
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964)). Buckley stated that this right was especially
sacred with regard to political campaigns. Id. at 14-15. "[I]t can hardly be doubted that the
constitutional guarantee has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of
campaigns for political office." (quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971)). This
strong protection of political expression squared with earlier Court precedent. See, e.g., Mills v.
Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) ("Whatever differences may exist about interpretations of the First
Amendment, there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to
protect the free discussion of governmental affairs. This of course includes discussions of candidates

See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44-46, 79. This analysis is the same as that used by the Court to
assess other political speech restrictions. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 334 (1988); Board
of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 573 (1987); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry
Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). For an overview and critique of the compelling
interest-narrowly tailored test for content-based restrictions, see Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech,
PermissibleTailoringand TranscendingStrictScrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417 (1996).
12

See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26. At the same time, Buckley explicitly rejected as "wholly foreign

to the First Amendment" the argument that the government possessed an important interest in
"equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections." Id. at
48-49. In a later case, Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), the Court
would find a compelling interest in removing the corrosive and distortive effects of large corporate
wealth on elections. See discussion, infra notes 160-165 and accompanying text.
13

See id. at 46. The Court proffered two reasons for this conclusion. First, independent

expenditures by definition can not be coordinated with a campaign, and thus will provide "little
assistance to the candidate's campaign and indeed may prove counterproductive." Id. at 45-47. Second,
the lack of coordination and the unpredictability of independent advocacy undermines the danger of
a "quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate." Id. The Court has repeated this
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Court went on to approve modest regulation of campaign-related independent
expenditures in the form of reporting and disclosure requirements.' 4 The Court,
however, once again erected the "core" First Amendment status of "issue discussion
and advocacy of a political result" to withhold independent issue advocacy from
those requirements.'"
In essence, the Court established a three-tiered structure of regulation of
campaign expenditures - coordinated contributions (strict limits), independent
expenditures (disclosure and reporting requirements), and independent issue
advocacy (no regulation). In doing so, the Court faced a new challenge:
distinguishing among the three tiers. The Court recognized that setting apart the
latter two categories - discerning between "discussions of issues and candidates
from more pointed exhortations to vote for particular persons '16 - would be a
complex task: "[T]he distinction between discussion of issues and candidates and
advocacy of election or defeat of candidates may often dissolve in practical
application ....Not only do candidates campaign on the basis of their positions
on various issues, but campaigns themselves generate issues of public interest."' 7
To make this distinction, the Court established a line of analysis looking for
"express advocacy."' 8 To distinguish independent issue advocacy from coordinated
contributions, the Court's task appeared less difficult. It simply defined issue
advocacy as inherently independent, encompassing those communications
undertaken in an uncoordinated fashion by an "individual other than a candidate
or a group other than a political committee."' 9 Thus, coordination analysis would

rationale in later cases.

See, e.g., Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Election

Comm'n, 116 S. Ct. 2309, 2315-16 (1996) ("[L]imitations on independent expenditures are less
directly related to preventing corruption [than those on contributions limits."); Federal Election
Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480,498 (1985) ("[TMhe absence
of prearrangement and coordination undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate, and
thereby alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper
commitments from the candidate.").
14

See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67-68.

Is

Id. at 79.

16

Federal Election Comm'n v. MCFL, 479 U.S. 238, 249 (1986).

17

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 42.

is

Id. at47.

19

Id. at 79-80.
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segregate issue advocacy expenditures from contributions. Confident in these two
analytical safeguards, the Court granted issue advocacy its fully protected status.
B.

Express Advocacy: The "Magic Words" Standard

The "express advocacy" standard first emerged in Buckley, which struck
down aspects of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA)2 ° that limited
campaign and independent expenditures but upheld contribution and Political
Action Committee (PAC) limits and a public financing scheme for the Presidential
election.2" Specifically, the "express advocacy" prong emerged as the Court
examined the $1,000 limit on independent expenditures. The Court expressed
concern that in targeting "any expenditure relative to a clearly identified
candidate,"' FECA's language was unconstitutionally vague and would chill core
First Amendment expression. In order to "save" the statute, the Court held that
that portion of the Act should "apply only to expenditures for communications that
in express terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identifiedcandidatefor
federal office."' 4 In a footnote, the Court further defined this phrase to include
"communications containing express words of advocacy of election or defeat, such
as 'vote for,' 'elect' 'support,' 'cast your ballot for,' 'Smith for Congress,' 'vote
against' 'defeat' and 'reject."' Even with this added clarity, the Court ultimately
rejected the independent expenditure limit,26 but it incorporated its "express
20

Fed. Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-55 (1994).

21

See Buckley, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).

22

18 U.S.C. § 608(e)(1) (Supp. IV, 1970) (repealed 1976).

23
While the Court noted that FECA had defined the terms "expenditure," "candidate," and
"clearly identified," it held that the "use of so indefinite a phrase as 'relative to' a candidate fails to
clearly mark the boundary between permissible and impermissible speech." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 41.
Even in the context of the later clarification - "advocatingthe election or defeat of such candidate"
- the Court found the definition lacking. Id. at 42 (quoting 18 U.S.C. 608 (e)(1) (Supp. IV, 1970)
(repealed 1976)).
24

Id. at 44 (emphasis added).

25

Id. at 44 n.52.

See supranote 13 and accompanying text. Interestingly, in striking down the provision, the
Court argued in part that a narrow express advocacy standard would not comprise an effective
26

"loophole-closing" standard. "[U]nscrupulous persons and organizations" could "skirti] the restriction

on express advocacy of election or defeat but nevertheless benefitol the candidate's campaign."
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45.
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advocacy" analysis into FECA's reporting and disclosure requirements 7 for
independent expenditures, which the Court upheld.2" Thus, when individuals and
groups "make expenditures for communications that expressly advocate the election
or defeat of a clearly identified candidate," they are subject to FECA's reporting
and disclosure requirements.29 This "magic words" definition of "express
advocacy" was shortly cemented into place. Congress directly placed that standard
within its campaign finance legislation, 0 and in the following decade, lower courts
applied a rigid "magic words" test in examining "express advocacy."'"
The Court has revisited the "express advocacy" prong only once. Ten years
after Buckley, a pre-election flyer by a "pro-life" nonprofit corporation forced the
Court to re-examine its "magic words" standard. In a newsletter, the Massachusetts

Citizens for Life (MCFL) declared that "[n]o pro-life candidate can win in
November without your vote in September," and printed "Vote Pro-Life" on the
back page of the newsletter.32 In addition to these exhortations, the flyer listed the

27

See 42 U.S.C. § 434(e) (1994).

28

See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 84.

For detailed discussion, see infra notes 136-141 and

accompanying text.
29

Id. at 80 (emphasis added). The Court did not repeat the infirmities of a narrow "express

advocacy" standard that it had observed earlier. See supra note 26.
30

See 2 U.S.C. §§ 431(17), 441d (1994); H.R. Rep. No. 94-1057, at 38 (1976), reprintedin

1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 929. The legislation defines "independent expenditure" as "an expenditure by a
person expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate which is made
without cooperation or consultation with any candidate, or any authorized committee or agent of such
candidate, and which is not made in concert with, or at the request or suggestion of, any candidate, or
any authorized committee or agent of such candidate." 2 U.S.C. § 431(17) (1994).
31

See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm'n v. Central Long Island Tax Reform Immediately Comm.,

616 F.2d 45, 52 (2d Cir. 1980) (rejecting the FEC's context-based analysis of the committee's anti-tax
bulletin); Civil Liberties Union v. New Jersey Election Law Enforcement Comm'n 509 F. Supp. 1123,
1131 (D.N.J. 1981) (striking down a New Jersey law requiring regulation and disclosure by
organizations providing "political information concerning any candidate or candidates for public
office") (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-3(g) (West 1989) (effective date April 24, 1973) (deleted
by amendment 1983)); Federal Election Comm'n v. American Federation of State, County and
Municipal Employees, 471 F. Supp. 315 (D.D.C. 1979) (granting a motion to dismiss the FEC's claim
that a "Nixon-Ford" poster was express advocacy). Cf Orloski v. Federal Election Comm'n, 795 F.2d
15, 167 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (using a narrow express advocacy analysis to hold that although the purpose
of a candidate picnic was largely to "muster support" for an upcoming election, the picnic was not a
"political event").
32

Fed. Election Comm'n v. MCFL, 479 U.S. 238, 243 (1986). The flyer displayed a 'y' next

to candidates who supported the MCFL position on a particular issue, and an 'n' next to candidates
opposed to the MCFL position. Asterisks were placed next to candidates who had a "100% pro-life
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candidates for every state and federal office in Massachusetts along with each
candidate's record on three abortion-related issues. The flyer also displayed
pictures of thirteen candidates whom MCFL considered the strongest supporters of

its "pro-life" position.3 The back page of the flyer included a disclaimer that the
flyer "does not represent an endorsement of any particular candidate."34
The Court - calling upon its "magic words" test but seeming to relax the
standard in the process - found MCFL's flyer to constitute "express advocacy."
The Court held that the exhortation to "vote for 'pro-life' candidates," combined
with the identification and photographs of candidates "fitting that description,"
"provides in effect an explicit directive: vote for these (named) candidates.' 5 Thus,
although the words themselves did not meet the definition of the "magic words"
outlined in Buckley, the Court found express advocacy by looking at the broader
context of the message: although the message was "marginally less direct than,
'Vote for Smith'," the flyer "goes beyond issue discussion to express electoral
advocacy."36
The MCFL Court's apparent loosening of the Buckley "magic words"
standard has had little impact on issue advocacy decisions in the lower courts.
Although the Ninth Circuit and the FEC38 have since outlined a more flexible

voting record." Id.
33

See id.

34

Id.

35

Id. at 249.

Id. The MCFL Court made several other important conclusions concerning FECA. First,
it construed the language of 2 U.S.C. § 441b, which made it unlawful for corporations and labor
organizations to make contributions or expenditures "in connection" with federal election, to mean that
a corporate or union expenditure need only constitute "express advocacy" to be prohibited under the
provision. Idat 249. This marked a reading far broader than that contended by MCFL, which argued
that the words "of value" of § 441b(b)(2) implied a narrow definition of"in connection." See id. at
245. Moreover, although the Court held that the prohibition of § 441 b was unconstitutional as applied
to MCFL - a corporation without shareholders, which neither was established by a business
corporation or labor union nor accepted contributions from such institutions, and which was "formed
for the express purpose of promoting political ideas" and "cannot engage in business activities," id.
at 264- it predicted that the "class of organizations" like MCFL that avoid the requirements of § 441
"will be small." Id. at 264.
36

See Fed. Election Comm'n v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857, 861 (9th Cir. 1987). Analyzing an
advertisement lambasting Jimmy Carter in his bid for re-election, the Ninth Circuit adopted a broader,
context-based definition of "express advocacy." Specifically, the Court held that "speech need not
include any of the words listed in Buckley to be express advocacy under the Act, but it must, when read
as a whole, and with limited reference to external events, be susceptible of no other reasonable
37
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approach to identify express advocacy, other courts continue to adopt a more rigid

"magic words" framework, as demonstrated by the First Circuit approach?9 In fact,

the FEC's revised approach was struck down by the First Circuit.4 In short, the
"magic words" test remains firmly in place.
C.

Defining Coordination

Beginning with Buckley and continuing through Colorado Republican
Campaign Committee v. Federal Election Commission,4 the Court, following
FECA, has framed the definition of independent issue advocacy as implicitly
requiring that such advocacy not be coordinated with a candidate or her campaign.
In Buckley, the Court explicitly set aside the threat that independent issue advocacy

interpretation but as an exhortation to vote for or against a specific candidate." Id. at 864. A District
of Columbia district court applied the standard set forth in Furgatch to find three National
Organization for Women letters to comprise issue advocacy. Federal Election Comm'n v. National
Org. for Women, 713 F. Supp. 428, 434-35 (D.D.C. 1989).
38

See infra notes 191-194 and accompanying text.

In contrast to Furgatch,the First Circuit applied and defended a rigid "magic words" test in
striking down and FEC regulation of voter guides. 11 C.F.R. § 114.4(b)(5)(1). See Faucher v. Federal
Election Comm'n, 928 F.2d 468 (1st Cir. 1991). The court defended the "bright-line" standard
established in Buckley as a certain way to avoid government or court examination of the intent and
meaning of speech that lacked "magic words." Such an effort to distinguish between "discussion,
laudation, general advocacy, and solicitation" places the political speaker "wholly at the mercy of the
varied understanding of his hearers and consequently of whatever inferences may be drawn to his intent
and meaning. Such a distinction offers no security for free discussion." Id. at 471-72 (quoting
Buckley, 424 U.S. 1, 43 (1976) (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 535 (1945))). Other courts
have been equally rigid in looking for"magic words." See Fed. Election Comm'n v. Christian Action
Network, 894 F. Supp. 946, 948 (W.D.Va. 1995) (ruling that advertisement criticizing Presidential
support for "radical" gay issues was issue advocacy because it did not use "explicit words" calling for
"electoral action"), summarily affdper curiam, 92 F.3d 1178 (4th Cir. 1996); Fed. Election Comm'n
v. Survival Educ. Fund Inc., 89 Civ. 0347, 1994 WL 9658 (S.D.N.Y., Jan. 12, 1994), affd in part,
rev'd in part, 65 F.3d 285, 289 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that mailing claiming that Ronald Reagan's
"anti-people policies must be stopped" was not express advocacy) (quoting letter from Benjamin Spock
M.D., to the general public (July 23-27, 1984)).
39

40

See Maine Right to Life Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 914 F. Supp. 8, 12-13 (D. Me.

1996) (holding that "magic words" allow candidates to "know from the outset exactly what is permitted
and what is prohibited," and that the FEC standard "chills" political expression), summarily af'dper
curiam, 98 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 66 U.S.L.W. 3254 (BNA Oct. 7, 1997).
116 S. Ct. 2309 (1996) (upholding as "independent expenditures" ads run by the Colorado
Republican Party).
41
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expenditures could be coordinated with a campaign by simply calling upon the logic
of the statute: any "controlled or coordinated expenditures are treated as
contributions rather than expenditures under the Act" and are subject to FECA's
contribution ceilings.42 In other words, issue advocacy is inherently uncoordinated.

Summarily making this point, the Court did not attempt to fine-tune the phrase
43

"controlled or coordinated" in great detail. Rather, looking at the legislative
history and the "purpose of [FECA]," the Court established the coordination
standard by concluding that "all expenditures placed in cooperationwith or without
the consent of a candidate, his agents, or an authorized committee of the candidate"
would be deemed contributions, rather than independent expenditures."
Neither the Court nor Congress has wavered from, nor elaborated upon, this
standard. Congress imported Buckley's language into its definitions of independent
expenditures and contributions, but with little additional detail.4" Moreover, most
major independent advocacy cases since Buckley have involved messages whose

"independence" was not contested; the coordination prong was neither litigated nor
fine-tuned. For example, there was no contention that MCFL's newsletter or the

Michigan Chamber of Commerce's intended advertisement in Austin v. Michigan
State Chamberof Commerce 46 was coordinated with political campaigns, and the
Court ruled along other lines. In those cases where the Court has analyzed at
greater length the presence of coordination and its importance as a prong

42

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46. The Court elaborated in a footnote that FECA provided that

expenditures made "on behalf of a candidate"- those "expenditures 'authorized or requested by the
candidate, an authorized committee of the candidate, or an agent of the candidate"' - were to be treated
as "contributions by the person or group making the expenditure." Id.at 45 n.53 (citing 18 U.S.C. §
608(c)(2)(B) (repealed 1976)).
FECA itself did not use the words "coordination" or "control," but "on behalf of a
candidate." See 18 U.S.C. § 608(c)(2)(B) (repealed 1976).
43

44

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46 n.53 (emphasis added).

The statutory language includes in its definition of contribution any expenditure "made by
any person in cooperation, consultation, or concert with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate,
his authorized committees, or their agents ... ." 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(7) (1994). See also 2 U.S.C. §
431(17) (1994) (defining independent expenditures as expenditures "advocating the election or defeat
of a clearly identified candidate which [are] made without cooperation or consultation with any
candidate, or any authorized committee or agent of such candidate, and which is not made in concert
with, or at the request or suggestion of, any candidate, or any authorized committee or agent of such
candidate").
45

494 U.S. 652 (1990) (upholding Michigan state ban on independent expenditures by
corporations).
46

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1997

11

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 100, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 10
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100:141

distinguishing tiers of speech protection, it has elaborated only slightly on the
standard.
In FederalElection Commission v. NationalConservative PoliticalAction
Committee,4 7 even though the Court described at length the virtues of independent

expenditures relative to contributions,41 the Court provided scant analysis in
defining coordination; in looking at the activities of two political action committees
at bar, it simply concluded: "these expenditures were 'independent' in that they
were not made at the request of or in coordination with the official Reagan election

committee or any of its agents."'9 Likewise, the Court's 1996 decision in Colorado
Republican left the coordination standard equally unspecified. Although the case
involved a battle over whether party expenditures are implicitly coordinated, and
despite dozens of references to the term "coordinated," the decision provided little

additional precision to that term. Instead, in findifig the Colorado Republican Party
not to have coordinated with a candidate," the Court merely pointed to "the
uncontroverted direct evidence that this advertising campaign was developed ...

independently and not pursuant to any general or particular understanding with a
candidate.""1 Without more detailed standards along which to assess the presence

of coordination, lower courts have hesitated to conclude that questionable relations
between advocacy groups, political committees and candidates comprise

coordination. 2 In a recent case striking down new FEC regulations of voter guides,
in fact, the most the First Circuit could say about the Court's coordination standard

470 U.S. 480 (1985) (striking down a FECA provision making it a criminal offense for an
independent political committee to expend more than $1,000 to further the election of a presidential
candidate who receives public funding).
47

48

See supra note 13.

49

NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 490.

so

The party ran an advertisement criticizing the Democratic candidate before a Republican

candidate had been selected. See ColoradoRepublican FederalCampaign Comm'n, 116 S. Ct. 2309,
2315 (1996).
5l

Id.

52

See, e.g., Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 745 F.

Supp. 742, 745-46 (D.D.C. 1988) (denying plaintiff's suit to compel an FEC investigation of the use
of common consultants as prohibited coordination); Stark v. Federal Election Comm'n, 683 F. Supp.
836, 839-40 (D.D.C. 1988) (denying plaintiff's suit to compel an FEC investigation of coordination
between political opponent and several political action committees and associations). Cf Clifton v.
Federal Election Comm'n, 114 F.3d 1309, 1315 (1st Cir. 1997) (striking down an FEC voter guide
provision which regulated contact between groups distributing voter guides and political candidates).
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is that it "implie[s] some measure of collaboration beyond a mere inquiry as to the
position taken by a candidate on an issue."53
To summarize, the Court and current legislation rely on the twin prongs of
"express advocacy" and coordination to distinguish the independent discussion of
issues from messages which can be regulated under campaign finance law. Despite
this important role, these prongs developed within a rather limited stream of cases,
and with scant analysis and little refinement over time. Unfortunately, 1996 would
show that the Court and the current law do not define either prong in a way that
allows them to serve their purpose. Moreover, 1996 would also show that the
express advocacy standard has overshadowed the equally critical need to focus on
coordination, eliminating that element from today's political understanding of issue
advocacy.
III. ISSUE ADVOCACY IN ACTION: THE FAILURE OF THE STANDARDS

A.

1996: The PoliticalFault-Line

The broad use of "issue advertising" and the FEC-created loophole of "soft' leveled an overwhelming one-two punch in the 1996 federal
money"54
elections.
The estimated price tag of the election cycle was $2.7 billion, shattering the cost
total of any past election year.55 This total included more than $250 million raised
in "soft-money" by the Democratic and Republican parties ' 6 and more than $70
million spent by interest groupsY7 Issue advertising comprised a primary target of
these unparalleled dollar amounts.
The first wave of the issue advertisement "airwar" began more than one
year before the election. Smarting from the 1994 Republican Congressional sweep,

53

Clifton, 114 F.3d at 1311.

"Soft money" is money that is ostensibly given for non-campaign, "party building" activity,
such as "get out the vote" drives. As such, it falls outside campaign finance regulations, as opposed
to "hard money," which is regulated. For a more detailed discussion of "soft money," see infra notes
150-153 and accompanying text.
54

See Ruth Marcus & Charles R. Babcock, The System Cracks Under the Weight of Cash;
CandidatesPartiesandOutside, THE WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 9, 1997, at Al [hereinafter The System
Cracks].
55

See Deb Reichmann, The Associated Press, PartiesRaised $263.5M in Soft Money Over 2
Years, THE RECORD, N. N.J., Feb. 17, 1997, at A17.

56

57

See The System Cracks,supra note 55.
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armed with a substantial war chest, and comforted by the lack of a primary
opponent, President Clinton agreed in late 1995 to launch an early advertising blitz
costing several million dollars per week s After several test advertisements
featured the President as "tough on crime," the first wave comprised a series of
advertisements attacking the Republicans on their proposed $270 billion Medicare
cut. These advertisements contrasted a stately Clinton standing next to an American
flag in full color with gray head shots of Bob Dole and Newt Gingrich. While the
ad described Clinton as "right to protect Medicare, [and] right to defend our
decision as a nation," it stated that the Republican leaders were "wrong to cut
Medicare benefits" by $270 billion, and in one ad, followed their images with a flatlining heart monitor 9 Similar ads ran continuously until the November election,
reaching more than 125 million people. 60 These advertisements were dubbed and
bankrolled by campaign officials as "issue advertisements," as they lacked the
necessary "magic words."
Emerging from the primaries in the spring of 1996, the Dole campaign,
short of cash and stung by the early Democratic onslaught, mirrored its opponent's
strategy. The campaign kicked off with a sixty-second ad titled "The Story" which
devoted fifty-six seconds to a biography of candidate Dole. Justifying this ad with
the statement that Dole's "bio" comprised an "important issue," the Republican
National Committee (RNC) spent $18 million airing it, out of a total of an estimated
$35 million spent on issue advertising.61 Other ads, while touching upon crime,
drugs, taxes, welfare reform, and the balanced budget, primarily comprised attacks
of Clinton.62 Closer to the election, the Republican Party donated millions of
dollars to partisan special-interest organizations - including Americans for Anti-Tax

58

See BOB WOODWARD, THE CHOICE 233-39 (1996); John Kifner, ClintonAdvertising Plan

Led to Asian-American Donors,N.Y. TDMES, April 14, 1997, at B7 [hereinafter AdvertisingPlan]; The
System Cracks,supra note 55.
WOODWARD, supra note 58, at 237-39; James E. Barnes, Big Issues,Big Money, Big Stakes,
27NAT'L J. 2188 (1995).
59

60

See The System Cracks, supra note 55.

61

Charles R. Babcock & Ruth Marcus, A Hard-ChargingFlood of 'Soft Mvoney', THE

WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 24, 1996, at Al; The System Cracks, supra note 55.
62

See Martha T. Moore & Richard Wolf, RepublicansRoll Out Their Ads, USA TODAY, May

17, 1996, at 4A.
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Reform ($4.6 million) and the National63 Right to Life Committee ($650,000) which then ran their own ad campaigns.
In addition to the higher profile presidential campaigns, issue ads permeated
campaigns in two other ways. First, both parties lavished millions of dollars upon

House and Senate races. Most spending went to a combination of issue ads and
direct attack ads. 6' Second, special interest groups exuberantly entered the issue
advocacy fray. Following successful televised attacks of the "Contract with

America" as well as Republicans opposed to a minimum wage increase, the
American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organization (AFL-CIO)
spent $35 million in a series of ads targeting individual Republican House
66
candidates on issues ranging from Medicare, taxes, education, and pensions.
Although AFL-CIO President John Sweeney stated his purpose was to "take back
the Congress and take back our country," and union officials worked closely with
candidates and political parties, the entire ad campaign was labeled issue
advocacy.67 Groups of all sorts followed suit, vying on all sides of the
Congressional and Presidential races. Prominent players included: the Sierra Club;
the National Education Association; the Christian Action Network; the National
of Commerce; Citizen Action; and
Rifle Association; the United States Chamber
68

numerous other national and local groups.

See Charles R. Babcock, Anti-Tax Group Got Big Boost from RINC as Election Neared,
WASH. POST, Dec. 10, 1996, at A4 [hereinafter Anti-Tax]; Charles R. Babcock & Ruth Marcus, RNC
Gave $2 Million to Tax-Reform Group, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 1996, at A9 [hereinafter RNC].
63

See Eliza Newlin Carney, Party Time, 28 NAT'L J. 2214 (1996); Ruth Marcus, Reinterpreting
the Rules, 'Independent Expenditures'Alter Senate Races, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 1996, at Al; Bill
Paxon, NRCC Unveils Ad Campaign to Promote Republican Congress, Press Release, July 23, 1996.
64

65

See The System Cracks, supra note 55.

See Gil Klein, Aggrieved Republicans Finding Labor'sMedicare Ads a Bitter Pill,THE
RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, July 7, 1996, at A6; Ruth Marcus, Taking 'Voter Guides' to the TV
Audience; AFL-CIO Tries New Approach in 28 Districts,WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 1996, at A16.
66

67

Julian Gruenwald & Robert Marshall Wells, At Odds with Some Workers, AFL-CIO Takes

Aim at GOP, 54 CONG.

Q. WKLY. REP. 993, 994 (1996).

See The System Cracks,supra note 55. Individual campaigns often totalled in the millions
of dollars. Citizen Action, for example, spent seven million dollars criticizing Republicans on
Medicare, the environment, and education. The Sierra Club aired $3.5 million in ads. See id.

68
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Express Advocacy and CoordinationRunning Rampant

"Issue ads" of two sorts dominated the 1996 campaign: (1) those which
clearly made "pointed exhortations to vote 6 9 for a given candidate, and (2) those
which were directly planned by or coordinated with a candidate's campaign.
Instead of falling within either of those Court prongs, triggering FECA regulation,
such advertisements ran as pure issue ads in 1996. This allowed candidates, their
parties and their supporters to skirt campaign finance regulations and introduce the
very problems which those regulations, backed by the Court's authority, had sought
to avoid.
1.

Express Advocacy Without "Magic Words"
a.

The 1996 Record

The 1996 elections showed that advertisements which lack the Court's
"magic words" can still be designed and utilized primarily "for the purpose of
influencing [an] election."70 In other words, they showed that a rigid "magic words"
test fails to effectively detect most cases of potentially corrupting "express
advocacy."
Eyed by their timing, the districts in which they ran, and the depth with
which they addressed issues, the DNC and RNC presidential advertisements were
unmistakable salvos in a campaign about candidates. Some lacked any issue
component whatsoever; others used issues as weapons to denigrate an opponent, but
did not discuss them in even the barest detail. Examples are plentiful. As discussed
above, the RNC's most important nationwide advertisement - the Dole biography
- used just the final four seconds to address issues.7 Negative RNC ads were
equally candidate-focused; one solely discussed Clinton's attempts to avoid a sexual
harassment suit 2 DNC ads mirrored the Republicans' ads. Only listing issues in
a rapid-fire display of words - "America's values," "economic growth," "welfare,"
69

Federal Election Comm'n v. MCFL, 479 U.S. 238, 249 (1986).

70

42 U.S.C. § 431(8)(a)(i) (1994).

71

See Babcock& Marcus, A Hard-ChargingFloodof 'SoftMoney', supra note 61; The system

Cracks; supra note 55.
72

See Letter from Ann McBride, President Common Cause, to Janet Reno, Attorney General

36 Oct. 9, 1996 [hereinafter Common Cause] (on file with author). For other candidate-centered Dole
ads, see The Associated Press, Dole AdAttacks on DrugIssue,NEWSDAY, Sept. 21, 1996, at A6; Judy
Keen, Dole Ad Doubles Up: Drugs, Character,USA TODAY, Aug. 27, 1996, at 10A.
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"education," and "Medicare"- with scant elaboration, many such ads' central effect
was to demonize Dole and House Speaker Newt Gingrich while praising Clinton.

Finally, although most issue ads did not explicitly seek votes through "magic
words," many ended with direct calls to action: "Tell President Clinton you won't

be fooled again," or "It's time to say yes to the Clinton plans - yes, to America's
families."'74
Numerous party ads for House and Senate races and interest group ads were
equally campaign-centered, dealing with issues only shallowly and calling for action
by voters without directly stating "magic words." An RNC ad aimed at the House
elections showed a crystal ball and asked "What would happen if the Democrats
controlled Congress and the White House? [I]f we give the special interests a blank
' This ad aired in fifty of the most
check in Congress, who's going to represent us?"75

closely contested districts.76 Other ads directly denounced rival candidates. In a
Rhode Island Senate campaign, for example, an RNC ad lambasted Democratic
candidate Jack Reed's position on welfare, stating: "It's outrageous.... That's
liberal. That's Jack Reed. That's wrong." Despite this virulence, the ad avoided
"magic words" by closing with a plea for voters to "Call liberal Jack Reed. Tell
him his record on welfare is just too liberal." From the AFL-CIO 78 to Americans

Common Cause, supra note 72, at 24-26. See also Howard Kurtz, Democrats' Ad Blitz
Echoes Bush Theme of Change a 'Risk', WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 1996, at Al.
73

Common Cause, supra note 72, at 25, 34-38. See also Ruth Marcus, PoliticalAdsTest the
Limits: 'IssuesAdvocacy' Growing DespitePartisanshipConcerns,WASH. POST, April 8, 1996, at Al
[hereinafter PoliticalAds].
74

75

Martha T. Moore, GOP Ad: Don'tReturn to Past Warns Against Shift in Congress, USA

TODAY, Oct. 29, 1996, at
76

10A.

See id.

Carney, Party Time, supra note 64, at 2216. Positive ads also urged voters to take action.
A GOP ad in Michigan's Eighth District race stated: "Dick Chrysler voted to reform Congress....
Tell him to keep fighting for commonsense change." Id.
77

78

Labor ads ran the gamut of issues, fiercely criticizing Republican Congressional candidates

by name but never mentioning "magic words," although they usually ended with a call to action. One
AFL-CIO ad warned that "[Congressman] wants to cut Medicaid and Medicare for our parents, cut
education and college loans, all to give a huge tax break to big business and the rich. ... Let's tell
[Congressman] to stop the political games and stand up for working families for a change." Political
Ads, supranote 74. An International Brotherhood of Teamsters ad against Congressman Nathan Deal
(R-GA) urged "Next year, let's say: 'No Deal.' Because nobody needs a Congressman like Nathan
Deal." Robert Marshall Wells & Juliana Gruenwald, LaborAds Target GOP Newcomers, 54 CONG.
Q. WKLY. REP. 998 (1996).
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for Limited Terms79 to the Sierra Club,"° ads by independent groups mirrored the

party ads in their clear focus on specific elections and campaigns, despite some
discussion of issues. The AFL-CIO, Christian Action Network, and Sierra Club
also issued television "voter guides" in highly contested races."1

b.

Analysis: "Magic Words" Fails Political Advertising 101

That 1996 campaign advertisements did not use "magic words" but still
constituted a clear form of "express advocacy" is unsurprising given the nature of
political campaigns in the United States. Even at the time the Court set up the

"magic words" doctrine, it was common political wisdom that direct pleas for votes

were not necessary, and indeed could be ineffective, in campaign advertising. At

the same time, strict issue discussions also carry little appeal among viewers.
Instead of these two alternatives, a more sophisticated mixture of candidatecentered advocacy peppered with ambiguous issue references has long proved the
most effective advertising strategy!2 The 1996 elections merely repeated this
On a political flyer broadly distributed in the Illinois Senate race, Americans for Limited
Terms proclaimed: "Don't let career politicians play the old shell game on you!" The flyer then
featured a critique of the Democratic candidate's position alongside a grainy photograph, and praise
for the Republican candidate, alongside a clear, crisp headshot. PoliticalAds, supra note 74.
79

Targeting individual Congressmen for their votes on environmental issues, Sierra Club ads
urged voters to "keep Congress from doing any more damage." Eliza Newlin Carney, Air Strikes, 28
NAT'L J. 1313, 1316(1996).
80

81

The Christian Coalition presented to its members "scorecards," giving to "American

Christian voters the facts they will need to distinguish between good and misguided Congressmen,"
and rating members of Congress on a I to 100 scale. Leslie Wayne, PoliticalIssue Ads Worry FEC,
TBE SUNDAY GATEMAIL, Sept. 29, 1996, at 16A. See also Camey, Air Strikes, supra note 80, at
1317.
Beginning with William Henry Harrison's use of the "log cabin" and "Tippecanoe" in the
first full-fledged presidential campaign in 1840, presidential and other political candidates have more
often than not turned to speechless metaphors and images as primary weapons in eliciting voter
support See KATILEEN HALL JAMISON, PACKAGING THE PREsIDENCY 9-11 (1992). From the image
of a rail (Lincoln) and the teddy bear (Roosevelt), to the use of the newsreel to air image-laden attack
ads, to modem day images of "candidates reading to their children, fishing in a rushing stream, or
pausing to inspect peanuts in a warehouse bin," candidates have never had to rely on express calls to
vote to win over an electorate. Id. at 12.
Long before the "magic words" test placed a disincentive on such words, modem television
campaigns often eschewed such express "soap-selling" exhortations as "vote for Smith." In 1952,
Eisenhower ran ads calling on voters to remember the Korean war: "[tiake another look at your boy.
Think about him when you vote on Tuesday." Id. at 47. Adlai Stevenson countered with ads that also
avoided "magic words" by asking Americans: "[]sn't it a better 'hope for peace' to keep the military
subordinate to a civilian president." Id. at 50. Fourteen years later, the infamous "Daisy" portraying
82
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pattern, illuminating the inadequacy of a legal standard that seeks "magic words"
when advertisers in most cases would not utilize "magic words" anyway.

A combination of factors explains this trend. First, the lack of appeal of
detailed issue discussions became apparent as early as the 1940s and '50.83 Instead
of issue or party-centered campaigns, campaigns which focus on candidates and
images have become the norm, "where candidates seek office as individuals and
where voters rely upon the personal characteristics of candidates."84 This trend
reflects voter behavior studies showing that candidate image is the most important
short-term driver of how voters select candidates and parties. 5

Although candidate image is the engine of campaign success, campaign
staffs face a remaining challenge: a direct "hard sell" of a candidate is often

ineffective. As outlined in detailed strategy memos by the Nixon campaign staff in
1972, while the campaign's focus was to present the President as an "activist" with
"courage, decisiveness, and dedication," the question remained: how to present
these images without demeaning his "presidential" stature through direct appeals.8 6
Nixon's staffers discovered the answer - indirectly and subtly. As one memo
recommended: "The President's personal qualities of compassion, humor and
informality should never be the subject of a commercial. But by careful selection
offootage, and careful wordingof a commercial message, we can emphasize these

Barry Goldwater's hawkish nuclear position in a particularly macabre fashion was not the only one
which did not use or need "magic words" to make a strong political point; one Johnson ad focused on
Goldwater's plans for social security, urging voters "vote for keeping Social Security"; another
described the goal of Johnson's "war on poverty," and then urged: "Help win it." Id. at 191, 198, 219.
Nixon's 1968 ads focused on the angst of 1968 America, ending with the question, "[A]s we see and
hear things, millions of Americans cry out in anguish. Did we come all this way for this?" Id. at 247.
In 1972, George McGovern aired ads describing the killing of children in Vietnam: "[A]s we vote
November 7th, let us think of... all the other defenseless children of the world." Id. at 317.
Both Roosevelt and Truman benefitted from radio ads and newsreels that displayed flattering
"presidential" images, while their Republican counterparts' efforts to "talk facts" floundered. See id.
at 27, 31-33. Adlai Stevenson was the last candidate to stubbornly cling to issue-talk, losing badly
while running clips of past speeches in 30-minute telecasts. See id. at 61.
83

84

E.D. DOVER, PRESIDENTIALELECTIONINTHETELEVISIONAGE: 1960-1992 6(1994). See also

RiCHARD JOSLYN, MASS MEDIA AND ELEcTIONs
85

See, e.g.,

45 (1984).

DAN NiMMO & ROBERT L. SAVAGE, CANDIDATES AND THEIR IMAGES 190-91

(1976). Research has shown that although they may make judgments about candidates' images from
ads, voters "learn" very little about policy and issue positions from political advertisements; ads are
"not likely to assist the public in forming attitudes about future policy alternatives or the policy
preferences of candidates." JOSLYN, supra note 84, at 198, 203.
86

JAMIESON, supra note

82, at 295-98.
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characteristics in a subtle yet effective way.""7 The same memo recommended:
"Use an announcer'svoice-over and show film of the President in action. This
technique allows us to show the President as an activist, use excerpts from his
speeches, and yet have an announcer tell the basic story.... [T]he effect is of a
commercial that is for the President, not by the President.""8
Apart from showing images of a candidate "in action," perhaps the most
effective technique campaign staffs use to effect a desired candidate image without
directly discussing that image has been to strategically employ references. A 1972
study of voter reaction to election advertisements concluded that advertisements
which discussed issues in general terms proved more effective than direct image and
character ads:
While the image beliefs of many voters emerge from what is seen
on television, the candidate cannot easily and directly control these
beliefs. Perhaps it seems paradoxical, but we think a candidate
can develop a more favorable image through issue spots that
convince voters he can handle difficult problems, than through
image spots that try to create directly a favorable belief about his
personal qualities.89
A more recent survey of political advertisements showed that politicians heed this
wisdom, as most issue appeals are vague, and are usually tied intimately to
candidate qualities. The study concluded that "public policy positions are less
important to campaigners than are the impressions of candidates that policy
discussions leave with the voters.... [They] are used to communicate something
about the candidate as a person. 90 The 1996 political combatants used this very
9
strategy. '

87

Id. at 300 (emphasis added).

88

Id. at 299.

89

THoMAs E. PATERSON & ROBERT D. MCCLURE,POLITICAL ADVERTISING: VOTER REACTION

TO TELEVISED POLITICAL COMMERCIALS, Citizens Research Foundation 38 (date not available)

(emphasis added).
supra note 84, at 44. These appeals are made in such a way that voters are unlikely
to form "attitudes" about future policy alternatives or policy preferences, but rather will only "reassure
the public that the policy viewpoints of candidates are acceptable." Id. at 47.
90

JOSLYN,

A Clinton aide's language describing his tactics mirrors that of the Nixon team: in order to
win over voters who disliked Clinton, "[t]he key was to advertise on election issues only, not to
91

promote Clinton's candidacy." DICK MORRIS, BEHIND THE OVAL OFFICE 140 (1997).
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Two other factors demonstrate why "magic words" are often absent from
effective vote-inducing advertising. First, because television advertisements are 92a
component of a broader campaign which includes a bevy of communications,
"express advocacy" in advertisements is unnecessary. Candidates can make such
explicit exhortations at stump speeches, conventions, and other appearances, while
delivering a more subtle "sell" through advertising. Second, the evolution of
television has enhanced candidates' abilities to shape strong messages through
visual imagery as opposed to spoken or written words. Just as technology has
eclipsed the old corporate advertisement strategy of verbally describing a product's
cost and function, so too has it enhanced the ability of visual associations to
differentiate between candidates. 3 From Nixon's juxtaposition of a smiling Hubert
Humphrey with grisly scenes from the Vietnam war, to the infamous Willie Horton
ads of 1988, images pack the most powerful political punch? The court's "magic
words" test thus misses the fundamental point that such explicit words are simply
unnecessary to modem campaign advertising. Looking for and relying upon such
words to distinguish issue advocacy from candidate advocacy is therefore a fruitless
task.
2.

Cooperation and Coordination
a.

The 1996 Record

In addition to pervasive candidate advocacy under the guise of issue
advocacy, the campaigns of 1996 saw direct and continuous cooperation between
the organizations designing and funding issue advertisements and the candidates
who benefited from such ads. Indeed, the term "coordination" understates much of
the reality of 1996 because it implies that separate entities planned and undertook
given activities. In the Presidential campaigns of 1996, a single entity ran the
advertising show -the campaign committee itself.9

92

See JAMIESON, supra note 82, at 486-87.

93

See id. at 488.

94

See id.at 488-89.

95

For a summary of the extent of cooperation, see Common Cause, supra note 72.
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Essentially, the Clinton campaign directed and implemented the 1995 and

96
1996 issue ad machine, with the DNC serving as the campaign's financial conduit.

Clinton himself was "heavily involved in the day-to-day presentation of his
campaign through television advertising." 7 He was the "day-to-day operational
director of our TV ad campaign.... Every ad was his ad." ' In addition to direct

meetings between Clinton, Gore and top DNC officials discussing the strategy and
content of the ads,99 Clinton's top campaign advisers managed all facets of the ad
campaign and strategy.'
Moreover, the trail of money to pay for the
advertisements as well as these consultants' fees belied the distinction between
"hard" campaign money and "soft" party money.'0 ' Ads of a similar genre and
created by the same staff were paid for at one moment by the campaign, at the next
by the DNC.'" Finally, the White House itself, with Clinton at the helm and Vice
President Gore, among others, directly soliciting funds, led the fund-raising drive
to pay for these advertisements. 3

For detailed accounts of the intimate DNC-Clinton campaign connection, see The System
Cracks, supra note 55 ("For all intents and purposes, the DNC became an extension of the ClintonGore campaign.... [Clinton's] operation and the party's had been welded into one money machine.");
Stuart Taylor Jr., Scandal Hidden in Plain View, LEGAL TIMEs, March 17, 1997, at 27 (stating that the
DNC and RNC operated as "totally controlled cash conduits to finance unprecedentedly costly
television advertising promoting Bob Dole and Bill Clinton").
96

97

WOODWARD,

98

MORRIS, supra note 91, at 144.

supra note 58, at 353.

See WOODWARD, supra note 58, at 236, 345, 354,416; Kifner,Advertising Plan,supra note
58; Bob Woodward, Clinton Called ShotsforPartyAdBlitz; DNC Effort, While Pro-President Wasn't
Bound by Campaign FinanceCurbs, THE WASHINGTON POST, June 25, 1996, at Al.
99

100

See MORRIS, supra note 91, at 138-46. See also The System Cracks, supra note 55; Taylor,

supra note 96, at 28.
101

That difference "existed only in the minds of the bookkeepers and legal fine-print readers."

WOODWARD, supra note 58, at 236.
102

See Kifher,Advertising Plan,supra note 58 (describing how Clinton's campaign committee

paid for the first wave of test-ads ($2.4 million) on crime, but that the DNC paid for the second wave
of early ads ($800,000) regarding health care). The fees of those organizing Clinton's advertising were
paid by both the campaign and the DNC, as well as state parties through whom the DNC passed funds.
See Bob Hohler & Walter V. Robinson, Clinton PaidTop Strategists$15M, Big Ad CampaignsDrove
Fund-Raising,THE BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 19, 1996, at Al.
103

See MORRIS, supra note 91, at 150-51; WOODWARD, supra note 58, at 236.
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The RNC likewise worked hand-in-hand with the Dole campaign
throughout 1996. Although the party waited for Dole to emerge from the primaries,
the campaign's early financial straits compelled Dole to depend on the party."
Party-candidate coordination in planning and implementing advertising was thus not
suprising, nor hidden. The campaign's chief media strategist produced and directed
the RNC ad campaign of 1996, and the company he incorporated to manage the
RNC advertising resided within Dole campaign headquarters.' Unsurprisingly, the
RNC ads reflected the specific themes and presented the same language that Dole
voiced on the campaign trail. 6 Other top campaign officials, including both
pollsters and fund-raisers, also performed dual campaign and party roles. 7
Unlike the narrow and peculiar facts of Colorado Republican, where ads
were run by a state party before either a Republican or Democratic Senate candidate
had been selected, the national parties' support of House and Senate candidates
occurred well into campaigns between Democratic and Republican primary
winners. As one official of the Democratic Senate Campaign Committee (DSCC)
acknowledged, parties "knew exactly what these campaigns are attempting to do in
developing their message, how much money they have, where they're strong, where
they're weak."'0 8 Partisan accusations about alleged cooperation between parties
and candidates during 1996 therefore came as no surprise, and essentially stated the
obvious.0 9
Finally, independent interest groups coordinated much of their advertising
spending and strategy with leaders of parties and campaigns. First, groups who
were running ads in support of a given candidate at the same time were working

104
See Stephen Labaton, Limited Cash Likely to Restrict Dole's Campaign Message,, N.Y.
TIMES, May 16, 1996, at BI 1. Until it received general election funds in August, the Dole Committee
did not pay for a single television commercial. See James Bennet, Dole, Kemp and Their Tax Plan
Make First CommercialForay,N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1996, at A15.

105

See Common Cause, supra note 72, at 31.

106

See id. at 30-38.

107
See id at 30-31 (describing shift of leading Dole "soft money" fund-raiser Joanne Coe from
"hard money" to "soft money" duties once Dole campaign hit its "hard money" limits).
108

Carney, Party Time, supra note 64, at 2217.

109

See, e.g., Kathy Kiely, GOP Complaints Say Anti-HutchinsonAds Violate FederalLaw,

ARK.D)EmoCRAT-GAzErT, Oct. 17, 1996, at lB (describing the Republicans' accusation that DNCfunded ads were "produced in direct coordination" with the campaign of Senate candidate Winston
Bryant).
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directly with those candidates' staffs at the grass roots level.' Second, themes of
the candidates' and parties' campaigns and those of the independent advertising
campaigns often mirrored one another almost exactly. For instance, the AFL-CIO's
emphasis on proposed Medicare cuts and welfare were nearly indistinguishable
from the DNC's ads on the topic."' On the other side, business group ads attacking
"union bosses" used nearly identical language to National Republican Campaign
Committee (NRCC) ads run in the same districts, and both the independent ads and
the NRCC's ads often were launched simultaneously."' Third, such ads aired in
districts that were politically vulnerable to one party or another, comprising exactly
those areas where parties had chosen to focus their monies."'
Looking at such factors, each side loudly protested incidents of clear
coordination. In North Carolina's Second Congressional District, Republicans
discovered that the AFL-CIO and a Democratic candidate had hired "the same
individual, at the same media firm, in the same town, to place similar
advertisements, on the same television station, airing to the same market, in the
same weeks, and often at the same time.""' 4 Democrats could point to similar
evidence of collusion. In Montana, Democratic Senator Max Baucus was besieged
by four separate advertising campaigns by three interest groups and the NRSC, all
launched in the same week. None of the ads ran on the same stations and between
them they covered every major radio market in the state! 5 Moreover, the RNC's
generous donations to independent groups who in turn launched pro-Republican
advertising campaigns also constituted undeniable cooperation." 6

110

The AFL-CIO's "Project 95" and "Project 96" spent hundreds of thousands of dollars
directly helping Democratic candidates through grass-roots lobbying that included both professional
organizers and flocks of volunteers planning and staging political events, making phone calls, and
other activities. See Linda Killian, AlienatedLabor, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 2, 1996, at 16.

III

See supra notes 66, 73, 74 & 78 and accompanying text.

112

See Benjamin Sheffner, NRCC Set To Spend $10 Million on Vulnerable Seats, ROLL CALL,

July 25, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Currnews File.
113

See Carney,Air Strikes, supranote 80, at 1316; Gruenwald & Wells, supra note 67, at 993.

114

Mario Cino, Press Release, Oct. 10, 1996.

115

See Carney,.AirStrikes, supra note 80, at 1315-16.

116

RNC leaders denied knowledge of how the money would be spent. See Babcock, Anti-Tax,

supranote 63, at A4; Babcock & Marcus, RNC, supra note 63, at A9. These "mystery" groups were
often formed and led by operatives with close ties to a political party. See Charles Babcock & Ruth
Marcus, ForTheir Targets, Mystery Groups 'Ads Hit Like Attackfrom Nowhere, WASH. POST, Mar.
9, 1997, at A6; Jonathan Riskind, High Dollar Campaigning,THE COLuMBus DISPATCH, March 9,
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b.

Analysis

The 1996 elections thus illuminated the problems that emerge from a
vaguely defined coordination standard. As discussed above, the relevant Court7

cases have mouthed the coordination standard, but none has precisely defined it.'

The Court's words are essentially repeated in the FECA language,' which presents

only alliterative synonyms for coordination - "cooperation," "consultation," and in
"concert with'"- and only one specific example of such coordination: expenditures
made "at the request or suggestion of" a candidate." This weak standard creates

two significant problems.
First, the law's frailty has obfuscated the coordination prong in the minds
of campaigners and politicians. The accounts of campaign organizers, and the

outright brashness of their actions, show that most campaigns either misunderstood
or ignored outright the requirement that issue advertisements cannot be coordinated
by or with campaign committees or candidates. Instead, the assumption within

campaigns in 1996 was that if an advertisement lacked "magic words," it was not
an issue ad - regardless of whether coordination had occurred. 2 Even the nation's
highest legal official misstated the law when she claimed that "the proper
characterization of a particular expenditure depends not on the degree of
2
coordination, but rather on the content of the message."' '

1997, at 4D [hereinafter High Dollar];Jonathan Riskind, Strickland Says Ad Twists Lucasville Riot
Remarks, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 30, 1996, at 4B [hereinafter Lucasville Riot].
117

See supra,notes 41-53 and accompanying text.

118

See supra,note 45 and accompanying text.

119

2 U.S.C. § 441(a)(7) (1994).

See, e.g., Carney, Air Strikes, supra note 80, at 1315 (quoting an RNC spokesman, who
stated "there are no limits to the party, or really any other entity, running advertising or doing other
communication efforts that are aimed at a discussion of the issues."); Ruth Marcus, PoliticalAds,
supra note 74 (quoting a DNC press secretary, who stated that ads were "not saying "vote for, vote
against' so they're not campaign ads"). The common but mistaken Washington interpretation that
ColoradoRepublicanopened an even wider door for issue ads and independent expenditures by parties
added to this fundamental misunderstanding of the law. For a discussion highlighting the confusion
abgout the law among politicians, campaign officials, and lawyers, see Jill Abramson, Tape Shows
Clinton Involvement in Party-PaidAds; Legal Line is Unclear,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1997, at A20.
120

Letter from Janet Reno, United States Attorney General, to Sen. Orrin. G. Hatch 6-7 (Apr.
14, 1997) (on file with author).
121
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An ill-defined coordination prong also fails to capture the reality of political
campaigns: that even without direct and open coordination, parties and independent
groups are still able to undertake more subtle coordination with campaigns, accruing
all the benefits of more direct cooperation. The Buckley holding and Justices
Kennedy's concurrence in ColoradoRepublican correctly point out that the very
nature of political parties leads to continuous and pervasive coordination with
candidates seeking office." A similar situation exists for many independent groups.
Meeting often and working closely with party members or individual politicians on
other campaign issues such as PAC disbursements, wedded naturally and openly to
one party or another due to ideological similarities, and armed with much of the
same information, resources, and campaign tactics as party and campaign staffs,
many groups can muster ad campaigns that mesh nicely with the goals of a
candidate they support. Such activity will likely provide the same political pay-off
as outright coordination or direct financial support. The AFL-CIO campaign
exemplifies this type of virtual coordination: the union knew the vulnerable
Republican districts, placed political operatives in those districts to work with the
Democrats, coordinated with the Democrats over how to allocate its PAC money,
and ran ads quite similar in style and substance to the DNC ads running in the same
districts." On the Republican side, coalitions of business groups and conservative
nonprofit groups who had worked closely with Republicans throughout the 19951996 legislative session stood as party analogs in the 1996 elections; they undertook
all the forms of planning, advertising, direct mail, findraising and grass-roots work
that the Republican party itself undertakes, and as continuously met and strategized

The Court in Buckley stated that parties' "major purpose... is the nomination or election
of a candidate" and their expenditures "can be assumed to fall within the core area sought to be
122

addressed by Congress. They are, by definition, campaign related." Buckley, 424 U.S. 1, 79 (1996).

Justice Kennedy correctly observed in ColoradoRepublican that, as the purpose of parties is the
"selecting and supporting [of] candidates," a party's spending will "in most cases" be made in
cooperation with local candidates. ColoradoRepublican, 116 S. Ct. 2309, 2322 (1996) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). To elaborate on Kennedy's point,parties spend years before a race grooming top local
politicians to run for open or vulnerable seats; they also cooperate and actively communicate before
election seasons begin, as well as during elections themselves when discussing the direct party support
permitted.

See ELIZABETH DREW, WHATEVERrr TAKES 76-79 (1997). In Pennsylvania's 21st District,
in addition to running issue ads attacking the Republican candidate, the AFL-CIO spent more than
$150,000 to pay for the "95 Project" and the "96 Project." This involved a full-time professional
organizer conducting grass-roots lobbying in the district, and AFL-CIO members working as the
Democratic candidate's volunteers. See Guy Gugliotta & Ira Chinoy, Money Machine: The FundRaisingFrenzy of Campaign '96; OutsiderMade Erie Ballot a NationalBattle (pt. 2), WASH. POST,
123

Feb. 10, 1997, at Al.
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with party officials. 24 Like a rigid "magic words" test, a coordination prong which
does not target these forms of coordination fails to distinguish between true issue
advocacy and campaign expenditures that can be regulated. With this failure, the
Court's confidence that the threat of corruption from independent expenditures
"remains a hypothetical possibility and nothing more"'n proves unfounded.
IV. THE RESULT: UNDERMINING THE ENTIRE SYSTEM
A.

"Loophole" Around CampaignFinanceLaws

As they existed under the law in 1996, many issue ads clearly called for
voters to choose one candidate over another, and were after direct or indirect
coordination. While court decisions and FEC rulings will trickle in in forthcoming
years about 1996's issue ads, 26 if they remain consistent with current doctrine, they
will presumably find almost all such ads to be issue ads on the ground that they lack
"magic words." That likelihood, combined with a breadth and depth of
manipulation and misunderstanding of issue advocacy that no court could begin to
remedy, illustrates that both prongs of the Court's test have failed. That failing
opens a sizeable loophole around numerous other aspects of campaign finance

legislation put into place in previous decades, as 1996 demonstrated.
First, the fact that unlimited and undisclosed amounts of money can be
spent by or in coordination with a candidate for advertisements that "expressly
advocate" allows that candidate and her donors to sidestep the limits on individual

For a comprehensive look at how conservative non-profit groups coordinated activity among
themselves and with Republican Congressional campaign officials, see DREW, supranote 123, at 1819,28, 42, 170-71,207. See also Major Garrett, How to Behave Like a Majority Party,THE WKLY.
STANDARD, May 5, 1997, at 20.
124

125

NCPAC, 470 U.S. 480, 498 (1985).

At this time, the FEC has not ruled on any complaints about specific advertisements from
1996. Neither have courts rendered decisions on alleged violations of campaign finance law from the
1996 federal campaigns. Telephone interview with Liz Kurland, Information Department, Federal
Election Commission (Jan. 2, 1998). In fact, it was only just prior to the 1996 elections that courts
ruled on questionable issue advertisements from the 1992. See Federal Election Comm'n v. Christian
Action Network, 894 F. Supp. 946, 948 (W.D. Va. 1995), summarily aff'dper curiam,92 F.3d 1178
(4th Cir. 1996). According to campaign finance reform advocates, the slow pace of FEC
decisionmaking, and consequent court rulings, is in large part due to the flawed structure and lack of
sufficient financial support for the FEC. See, e.g., Fred Wertheimer & Susan Weiss Manes, Campaign
126

Finance Reform: A Key to Restoringthe Health of Our Democracy, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1126, 1148-49

(1994).
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and PAC contributions that were first upheld in Buckley.'27 Rather than adhere to
these limits, individuals can give unlimited "soft money" donations to a party,
perhaps at the insistence of campaign officials themselves, and that money can
directly support a given campaign through coordinated or campaign-related
advertisements. In 1996, gifts leading to Presidential coffees and Lincoln bedroom
28

stays were merely the most prominent of such individual contributions.'
Moreover, interest groups, in addition to or in lieu of their allowable PAC

spending, 2 1 can now rain far more money upon elections through unlimited issue
advertisements.
Second, issue ads in their current form have brought corporate and union

money back into elections in the very fashion that has been barred for most of this
century' and that the Court has deemed corrupting."' Whether through soft
money donations to national or state parties, through contributions to groups that
run issue ads, or through their own issue ads, corporations and unions can now

directly impact individual campaigns in an unregulated way which far surpasses
their PAC donations. 3 2 Major corporations, labor unions, and business and labor-

related interest groups took advantage of this opportunity in 1996.'
127

Individual contributions to candidates, political parties and other political committees are

limited to $1000 (per election), $20,000 (per calendar year) and $5000 (per calendar year). See 2
U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)A, B, C (1994). Individuals are also limited to $25,000 in total contributions in
any given year. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a (3) (1994).
128

For individual soft money donations at all levels, see, for example, Babcock & Marcus, RNC,

supra note 63 (describing $1 million donation by Rupert Murdoch to the California Republican Party,
which Democrats said had occurred due to the work of House Speaker Gingrich).
129

PAC contributions are limited to $5,000 per candidate (per election cycle), $15,000 for

parties (per year) and $5,000 for other political committees (per year). See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(2)
(1994).
130

Corporate money given "in connection" with federal elections has been banned since 1907;

union contributions were disallowed in 1943. BROOKS JACKSON, BROKEN PROMISE: WHY THE
FEDERAL ELECrION COMMIssION FAILED 41 (1990). See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (1994) (banning corporate
and labor organization contributions "in connection with any election to any political office").
131

See Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 655 (1990) (upholding

Michigan state ban on independent expenditures by corporations).
132

With its $35 million campaign spread out among about 75 districts, the AFL-CIO was able

to inject an additional $500,000 into each individual race. See Gruenwald & Wells, supra note 67, at
993.
Top soft money corporate givers to the Republican parties included Philip Morris
($2,508,118); RJR Nabisco ($1,148,175); American Financial Group ($794,000); Atlantic Richfield
($766,506); Union Pacific/Souther Pacific ($692,460); and Brown & Williamson ($635,000). Top
133
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Third, issue ads completely stymied the presidential campaign finance
system. Using issue ads, Clinton and Dole were able to shatter with impunity the
3
voluntary spending limits that both had agreed to in exchange for federal finding."
In fact, the very day in late 1996 that Clinton formally agreed to primary spending

limits, he hosted a coffee for major donors that was part of the broader effort that
already well into an
so dramatically fractured that limit. At the same time, he was
35
ad campaign that was costing millions of dollars per week.1
Fourth, issue ads allow national and state parties to transgress the
limitations on their allowable coordinated support of presidential or other federal

candidates. 36

For 1996, that limit was $12 million for the presidential

campaigns, 13 7 but as parties became the primary organizations bankrolling issue ads
designed by the campaigns themselves, that limit was clearly violated. Moreover,
the national parties shuttled money to state parties, or directed donors - particularly
politically unappealing ones -to give directly to state parties,' who then purchased
advertising time for issue ads the national parties had designed.' Doing so allowed
the national parties to avoid FEC disclosure requirements 4 and also saved those

corporate givers to the Democrats included: Communication Workers of America ($1,108,425); Walt
Disney ($997,050); Joseph Seagram & Sons ($945,700); United Food & Commercial Workers
($707,550); Revlon Group ($648,250); Lazard Freres ($617,000); Loral ($600,500). See Amy Borrus
& Mary Beth Regan, The Backlash Against Soft Money: Business is Fed Up, and It May Spur
Campaign-FinanceReform, BUsIE SSWEEK, March 31, 1997, at 34, 35.
In 1996, the presidential public funding system allowed for $37 million for primary
spending, to be paid for by contributions and public matching funds, and for $62 million in the general
election, all to be paid for by public funding. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 9001-9006 (1994).
134

135

See The System Cracks,supra note 55.

136

The limit is determined by a formula. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d)(2)-(3) (1994).

137

See Chris Conway, 'Issue Ads'Allow UnlimitedPoliticalPitches, CHARLESTON GAZETTE

AND DAILY MAIL, Sept. 15, 1996, at 19A.
See Charles R. Babcock, DNC DivertedControversialDonations;FECReports Don'tShow
Tobacco, Gambling Checks Sent to State Parties,WASH. POST, April 13, 1997, at Al; Paula Dwyer,
"A Second Set of Books" for the Democrats?: The DNC Directed UnreportedDonations to Key
States, BUSINESSWEEK, April 21, 1997, at 34.
138

139

See Jill Abramson & Leslie Wayne, Democrats Used the State Partiesto BypassLimits, N.Y.

TIMES, October 2, 1997, at Al; Ruth Marcus, DNC FindsEasy Way to Save 'HardMoney'; Democrats
Defend ChannelingDollarsfor Advertising PurchasesThrough State Parties,WASH. POST, July 1,
1996, at A4.
140

See 11 C.F.R. § 104.8(c) (1993).
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can generally allocate
parties precious hard money, because their state counterparts
141
a larger ratio of "soft money" toward advertisements.
Fifth, issue ads as they currently exist provide an easy route around FECA's
reporting and disclosure requirements, which comprise the primary device for
monitoring campaign-related expenditures and enforcing campaign laws. As the
Court stated in Buckley, disclosure requirements serve three important goals:
informing the electorate of the source of campaign money, deterring corruption by
exposing contributions and expenditures to publicity, and allowing the recordkeeping necessary to enforce contribution limits.142 Rigorous registration and
reporting requirements for contributions by individuals, contributions by PACs, and
for party and candidate expenditures, are equally vital to enforcing campaign laws,
particularly in maintaining control over corporate and union dollars.' Issue ads
allow organizations to evade such requirements and permit millions of dollars to
flow freely into campaigns when they would otherwise require disclosure and
reporting. All three purposes of disclosure outlined in Buckley are thus eviscerated.
B.

Re-introducing Corruption,the Perceptionof Corruption, andDistortion

By providing a loophole around current campaign finance laws, the issue
ad as it exists today re-introduces the potential for corruption, and the perception
of corruption, which FECA and Court decisions beginning with Buckley have
sought to prevent. In upholding contribution limits, the Court in Buckley
adumbrated two constitutionally compelling threats. First, "[t]o the extent that large
contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential
office holders, the integrity of our system of representative democracy is
undermined." 1" Equally destructive, the Court stated, "is the impact of the
appearanceof corruption stemming from public awareness of the opportunities for
abuse inherent in a regime of large individual financial contributions.' 145 Issue ads,
in allowing unchecked donations from previously illegal sources to play a direct
role in campaign politics, have introduced both of these threats into the system.
141

See I1 C.F.R. § 106.5 (a), (b), and (d) (1997) (setting out allocation ratios for hard and soft

money expenditures by national and state parties); Abramson & Wayne, supra note 139.
142

143

See Buckley, 424 U.S. 1, 66-68 (1976).
See 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-437 (1994) (§§ 435-436 repealed in 1980) (discussing the required

disclosures of federal campaign funds).
144

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27.

145

Id. at 27 (emphasis added).
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1.

Primary Cost Driver of Elections

The first clear danger from the proliferation of issue ads has been the sheer
amount of money they bring into the system. In the Presidential primary and
general elections, television advertisements comprised the largest expense item more than sixty percent of each candidate's spending from August to election
day.' 46 At least $70 million of these costs came from the "issue ads" run by the
Democratic and Republican parties.14 Additionally, the millions of dollars of partydesigned and independent issue ads showered upon Congressional and Senate races
nationwide created a spiral effect, increasing the pressure on all entities and
individual candidates to raise and spend additional funds to counter such attacks. 4 '
If an increased amount of money in the system contributes to the degeneration of
the political system through, among other effects, the increased potential for
corruption and perception of corruption, a growing lack of inequality in the system
between those with access to money and those without and providing an added
advantage to incumbents,
then issue advertisements are a hazard for their cost49
impact alone.

1

Beyond the large sums of money involved, however, these ads arouse even
greater concern because they are paid for with "soft money." 5 ' While outside the
scope of this Article, the dangers of corruption and the perception of corruption that
soft money poses are perhaps the largest campaign finance concern in Washington

146
See Ira Chinoy, In PresidentialRace, TV Ads Were Biggest '96 Cost by Far,WASH. POST,
March 31, 1997, at Al9.
147

See id.

See Gugliotta & Chinoy, supra note 123, at Al (describing how issue ads from the DCCC
and other groups increased a candidate's campaign cost to almost twice his original estimate).
149
For a discussion of the negative consequences of the high cost of campaigns, see, for
148

example, Fred Wertheimer & Susan Weiss Manes, supra note 126, at 1131-36.
150
The increased use of issue ads was directly linked to the frenzied quest for soft money. The
Clinton decision in 1995 to launch an aggressive "issue ad" campaign came hand in hand with two
other key decisions: (1) to have the Democratic National Committee pay for the campaign with soft
money rather than precious "hard money," and (2) to launch a "soft money" fundraising blitz to allow
the DNC, which was chronically short of funds, to avoid going into debt. It was these decisions which
initiated the "fierce pressure for money that overwhelmed the Democratic National Committee." Alison
Mitchell, Buildinga Bulging War Chest: How Clinton FinancedHis Run, N Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1996,
at Al.
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today.' Ostensibly designated for non-campaign, "party building" activity, soft
money is unrestricted, is donated in amounts as high as $50,000 and $100,000, and
comes primarily through corporate, union and individual donations that would not
otherwise be allowed in the system. The 1996 campaigns not only saw candidates
raise and spend three times as much soft money as in the last presidential election

- from $89 million in 1991-1992 to $263 million5 - but the election also made
clear that this money supports purposes beyond "party building" and poses a high

risk of corruption.' 54
2.

Added Threat of Quid Pro Quo

Carrying millions of dollars of soft money into the system, issue ads have
clearly added to the threat of quid pro quo-style political corruption. Many
organizers of issue ads and donors of soft money that bankrolled issue ads appear
to have secured much more than coffees and White House stays. Examples abound
of suspicious, seemingly quidpro quo situations from 1996. The battle over the
minimum wage bill pitted some of the largest organizers of issue ads and donors of

soft money; while labor gained a $.90 increase, business groups who had given to
Republicans through PACs and soft money garnered more than $21 billion in tax
breaks that accompanied the bill.'55 After the election, labor's issue ad investment
seemingly paid off in other ways.'56 And individual donors, such as Chiquita-owner
11
For detailed discussion of soft money and its problems, see, for example, JACKSON, supra
note 130, at 41-46; Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 126, at 1144-48; Fred Wertheimer, Stop Sojt
Money Now, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Dec. 22, 1996, at 38-39 [hereinafter Wertheimer, Stop Soft
Money].
152
See Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 126, at 1144-48.

153

The System Cracks,supra note 55.

154

See, e.g., Wertheimer, Stop Soft Money Now, supra note 151.

See Eric Pianin, Money Machine: The FundRaising Frenzy of Campaign '96, How Business
Found Benefits in Wage Bill (pt. 3), WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 1997, at Al. Provisions such as "a tax
credit for restaurants and pizza delivery companies.... a phase-out of the luxury tax on cars, ... and
the elimination of a tax on overseas earning of corporations," came after strong soft money support
from corporate interests on these issues. See John Jacobs, Funding Practicesfor PoliticalAccess
Becoming Obscene, THE FRESNO BEE, Jan. 31, 1997, at B7.
155

156

In a course of three weeks in the spring of 1997, Clinton came down strongly in favor of

labor positions on controversial issues: barring private corporations from providing social services and
requiring minimum wage for workfare plans under the new welfare legislation. The latter was "widely
interpreted as an effort to repay the union leaders who have supported the Democratic Party." Jason
DeParle, White House Callsfor Minimum Wage in Workfare Plan,N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1997, at A 1.
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Carl Lindner, who funneled more than $500,000 to state parties at the DNC's
behest were rewarded for their generosity." 7 Other examples of soft money donors
gaining access to the President or senior government officials and then reaping
rewards from this access include broadcast companies,' banking interests, 5 9 pro6 and donors gaining access to Department of Commerce
gambling organizations,"
6
'
trade missions'
These specific instances have also led to the second problem the Court
identified in Buckley: the perception of corruption. Surveys show a widespread
lack of faith regarding the current campaign system, a lack of faith driven by
cynicism over the role of money in the electoral process. According to an expansive
Washington Postsurvey, a substantial majority of the public feels the system suffers
157
Lindner's complaint against a restrictive trade practice of the European Union was the first
promoted by the U.S. before the World Trade Organization; Lindner then prevailed in a preliminary
ruling. See Brook Larmer & Michael Isikoff, Brawl Over Bananas,NEWSWEEK, Apr. 28, 1997, at 43;

Michael Weisskopf, The Busy Back-DoorMen, TIME, Mar. 31, 1997, at 40; WTO Sides with Chiquita

in Euro-BananaDispute, EUROWATCH, Apr. 4, 1997. The United States decided to promote Lindner's
case despite the fact that only 6,000 of Chiquita's 45,000 employees work in North America, and
nearly all of Chiquita's banana crop comes from South and Central America or Europe. See John
Maggs, BananasSplit U.S., Europe in WTO Spat, J.COM., Mar. 18, 1997, at IA.
In early 1997, Congress decided to lend to television broadcasters, free of charge, airwaves
for high definition digital television transmissions valued from $7 billion to $15 billion, making
broadcast television the only industry not required to pay for previously vacant airwaves. What many
decried as "corporate welfare" succeeded $3.5 billion in soft money donations to the national parties
by broadcasters in the 1995-1996 election cycle. See Leslie Wayne, BroadcastLobby Excels at the
158

Washington Power Game, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1997, at D2.

See, e.g., Maureen Dowd, Bubba Don't Preach, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 9, 1997, § 4, at 5
(attacking Clinton for the DNC arrangement of meetings between banking regulators and bankers who
had donated soft money); Douglas R. Harbrecht, Congress and FinancialDeregulation:A Gravy
Train, BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE, May 27, 1997 (describing the yearly debate over financial
deregulation, driven largely by campaign contributions by banking interests).
159

Millions of dollars in political donations to Republicans and Democrats seemed to pay off
for Steve Wynn, chief executive of Mirage Resorts, and other gambling interests, when three of the
nine persons selected to be on the National Gambling and Policy Commission were strong players in
the pro-gambling lobby, including the head of MGM Grand Casino and the head of the Nevada
Gaming Control Board. See William Safire, The Gambler's Bid, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1997, at A21.
160

Critics charged the Department of Commerce with handing out placements on its influential
trade missions to large donors. Under Secretary Ron Brown, for instance, the Office of Business
Liaison - led by a former top DNC fund-raiser- made those selection decisions. One watchdog group
found that more than one quarter of the companies on such trips were major Democratic Party
supporters, having given more than $10 million since 1990. See Bill Montague, The Trade-Politics
Connection: CriticsQuestion Power-Peddlingin Global Market, USA TODAY, Nov. 1, 1996, at lB.
161
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numerous dilemmas, all of which center on the dominant role of money. More than
eighty percent polled stated that the system needs to be overhauled, and almost
seventy percent of the general public said the primary reason people donate to
political parties through soft money is to gain "more access and influence" over
candidates.'
At 48.8 percent, 1996's voter turnout was the lowest in the nation's
history, possibly reflecting this falling confidence in the system. 63
3.

Distorting Congressional Races

A final result of uncontrolled issued ads is one which the Court has decried

in the past: the distortive effect on political campaigns of corporate and union
dollars. As the Court explained in MCFL, Austin and National Right to Work
' carry a
Committee," corporate funds "amassed in the economic marketplace"165
potentially corrosive impact in the political arena. Such funds accrue to enormous
sums due to "the unique state-conferred corporate structure that facilitates the
amassing of large treasuries."'" Thrown into the campaign system, this money "can
unfairly influence elections when it is deployed in the form of independent
expenditures, just as it can when it assumes the guise of political contributions.' 6 7
According to the courts, this distortive effect takes place in two ways. First,

corporate money can so benefit a candidate's campaign that it buys his support on
162

Richard Morin & Mario Brassard, Those Who Give and Those Who Watch Want a New

Direction,WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 1997, at Al. Other complaints included the following: that campaign
contributors have excessive influence on elected officials; that big contributors and special interests
dominate campaigns; that contributions by companies that conduct business with the government are
prevalent; that money has too decisive a role in election results; and that the distance between voters
and political leaders is widening. See id. Almost 80% said they believed contributions to political
parties should be limited. See id.
163
See DREW, supranote 123, at 253; Burt Neubome, Court'sDecisionHas Been Disastrous
for Democracy, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 18, 1997, at 7B.

459 U.S. 197, 207 (1982) ("[S]ubstantial aggregations of wealth amassed by the special
advantages which go with the corporate form of organization should not be converted into political
'war chests' which could be used to incur political debts from legislators who are aided by the
164

contributions.").
165

MCFL, 479 U.S. 243, 257 (1986).

166

Austin, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990).

167

Id. See also MCFL, 479 U.S. at 256 ("This concern over the corrosive influence of

concentrated corporate wealth reflects the conviction that it is important to protect the integrity of the
marketplace of political ideas.").
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political issues. 68 Second, the level of advertising that corporate wealth engenders
misleads the public by exaggerating the support for a corporation's political ideas.169
As the Court foretold, these distortive effects brought havoc to many local
races in 1996, as issue ads run by parties, labor unions and other organizations
flooded the airwaves and overwhelmed local campaigns in a number of specific
ways. First, the message and image candidates tried to portray were often drowned
out by issue ads;17 even the supposed beneficiaries of issue ads were sometimes

bruised by those ads. 7 ' Candidates facing FECA limitations on "hard money"
sources struggled to respond to such attacks. They either were unable to counter,

relied on issue ads on their behalf, or undertook frenzied drives for additional
money to respond directly. 72 Second, attacks from out-of-region and national
parties changed the local nature of debates, drawing attention away from hometown issues in favor of less relevant concerns of the party or issue group. 73 Third,
issue ads carried a greater likelihood of inaccuracy and negativity due to less
accountability by outside groups and to the failure of blanket national ad campaigns

168
169

See Austin, 494 U.S. at 660.
See id.; MCFL, 479 U.S. at 258 ("The resources in the treasury of a business corporation

... are not an indication of popular support for the corporation's political ideas .... The availability
of these resources may make a corporation a formidable political presence, even though the power of
the corporation may be no reflection of the power of its ideas.").
170

In Michigan's Eighth Congressional District, the efforts of Republican Rep. Dick Chrysler

and Democratic candidate Debbie Stabenow were dwarfed by those of outside organizations. The
AFL-CIO spent $504,000 attacking Chrysler, the DNC spent $1 million criticizing the Republican
Congress, while the national Republican party, working largely through the state party, and an
independent business coalition responded with several hundred thousand dollars in retaliatory ads. See
Carney, Party Time, supra note 64, at 2217-18.
In a Rhode Island Senate race, fierce advertising by the RNC and NRSC hurt the Republican
candidate; its tone was too harsh, and the controversy surrounding the ads detracted from the candidate
and her issues. See id. at 2216.
171

172

After being the target of a state-wide flurry of negative issue ads from the National

Republican Senatorial Committee and four independent pro-business groups, Senator Max Baucus had
to spend $90,000 simply to respond to the attacks. See Carney, Air Strikes, supranote 80, at 1315;
Doug Obey, Baucus'Slim Lead Worries Dems, Tim HILL, June 12, 1996, at 13.
In Rhode Island, the Democratic candidate complained bitterly about $743,810 in RNC ads
and $100,000 in NRSC ads: "It's been an outrageous and blatant attempt by a national party to literally
buy a Senate seat.... A small state like Rhode Island, with small media markets, is particularly
vulnerable to this type of campaign waged by unaccountable money." Carney, Party Time, supranote
64, at 2216.
173
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to detect the nuances of local races. 74 Fourth, many ads were aired without
disclosure, often by unfamiliar or new groups, sowing confusion
within the
17

electorate about the sources of the messages they were seeing.

1

A case study of a Congressional campaign best illustrates these distorting
effects. 176 The race in Pennsylvania's 21st Congressional District, centered in Erie,
pitted a Republican freshman, Phil English, against Ron DiNicola, a Democratic

attorney who ran for the seat and lost in 1994. A DCCC ad in early 1995

"morphing" English's face into that of Newt Gingrich began an onslaught of outside
issue ads - mostly coming from Washington - which dominated the Erie airwaves.
In the following year, the NRCC, the Pennsylvania Democratic and Republican
parties (with national party money), the United States Chamber of Commerce, the

AFL-CIO, Citizen Action, the Republic Education Fund, Public Citizen, the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters; the National Right to Life PAC, and other

groups poured in at least $1.4 million, mostly in issue ads, into the race. 7 In one
twenty-hour stretch in November, more than 500 campaign ads aired on Erie
television stations. And on election eve, an unknown independent group which did
not disclose its funding sources - Citizens for Republic Education Fund - aired
more ads in Erie than either candidate. 7
Overall, outside advertising spending approximately equaled the total
spending of both candidates ($1.6 million). The sum represented almost twice the
In Ohio's Sixth Congressional District, a late issue ad run by a mysterious group - Citizens
for the Republic Education Fund - attacked the Democratic candidate over comments made regarding
a prison riot several years before. The attack came despite the fact that both the Republican Governor
and former Lieutenant Governor had praised the candidate for his "responsible remarks" during the
crisis. Riskind, High Dollar,supra note 116; Riskind, Lucasville Riot, supra note 116, at 4B. In
Illinois, a $120,000 issue ad mailing campaign against Senate candidate Bob Kustra by Americans for
Limited Terms attacked him for not signing a term limits pledge. Kustra, however, had signed a 12year limit pledge with another advocacy group. See Carney, Air Strikes, supra note 80, at 1317;
PoliticalAds, supra note 74.
174

In the closing weeks of many campaigns, unknown groups such as Citizens for Reform, the
Republic Education Fund and the Coalition for our Children's Future spent heavily on highly partisan,
pro-GOP advertising, without any disclosure. See Charles R. Babcock & Ruth Marcus, For Their
Targets, Mystery Groups' Ads Hit Like Attacks from Nowhere, WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 1997, at A6.
Some of these groups were led by people with close ties to or actual positions with a national or state
political party. See Gerald F. Seib, Shadow Boxing: IssueAds Leave Voters in the Dark, WALL STREET
J., Feb. 5, 1997, at A20.
175

176

See Gugliotta & Chinoy, supranote 123 for the full description of the following case study.

Because issue advertising spending does not require disclosure, that amount was probably
substantially higher. See id.
T?

178

See id.
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amount both candidates had spent on television and radio advertising ($833,000).
Moreover, the outside spending prompted the candidates to increase drastically their
own fund-raising and spending. English, who spent $417,000 in his 1994 victory,
had estimated that the 1996 election would cost him $600,000. After seeing the
initial DCCC and AFL-CIO attacks, he increased that estimate to $800,000, and
then to $1 million. Ultimately, he spent $1.2 million. At the same time, his
spending strategy changed dramatically. Rather than attacking DiNicola at a time
when he was most vulnerable in early 1996, English hesitated, fearful of future
issue advertisements to which he would have to respond. DiNicola, not fond of
fundraising, proved unable to secure the funds he needed to penetrate the issue ad
clamor.

179

Nor did this outside spending address the candidates' own campaign
messages, or issues particularly tailored to the region. English himself criticized a
Republican party ad ostensibly in his favor that portrayed a cigar-smoking "union
boss" as buying out Congress and DiNicola; the district was a strong pro-union,
heavy industry and steel region, so such attacks only hurt English. He was also
baffled by ads touting his Medicare record. He commented about the issue ad
attack: "it was disorienting, like having a debate with an air-raid siren in the
background."'' 0 Local commentators were offended by the dominance of
Washington interests over those of the communities within the district; charges of
carpetbagging and beltway influence permeated the campaign. In the end, English
won by a narrow margin, but the increased "issue advocacy" failed to spark
additional interest among the voters - ten thousand fewer people voted than in
1992."'
C.

Lessonsfrom 1996

Thus, the 1996 campaigns showed that the current prongs of express
advocacy and coordination are inadequately framed, causing an utter breakdown in
the campaign finance system. A rigid express advocacy standard that requires
"magic words" proved ineffective as it faced the realities of effective campaign
advertising. An ill-defined coordination standard collapsed for two reasons: its lack
of clarity led it to be ignored outright by campaigns and lawmakers, and its
vagueness failed to identify adequately the subtle and indirect coordination which
occurs in real-world campaigns. Failing at both ends, issue ads, combined with the

179

See id.

1SO

Id.

181

See id.
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soft money that feeds them, opened an immense loophole around current campaign
finance regulations, and incurred wide damage in doing so. Overall spending
skyrocketed. Corruption and the perception of corruption entered the system like
no time in recent history. And outside funds overwhelmed candidates and their
attempts to proffer locally-tailored messages in local elections. The same threats
to the electoral system that the Court has recognized in justifying past campaign
finance regulations have thus resurfaced through its own loose standards for issue
advocacy.
V. CHANGING THE STANDARDS

A number of proposals are on the table in Washington and bandied around
the newspapers and law reviews to solve current campaign finance problems. These

proposals include free or subsidized television advertising, a public financing
system for all campaigns combined with voluntary spending limits, an outright ban
on soft money, the imposition of spending limits, full and mandatory disclosure for
all campaign-related expenditures, the reversal of Buckley, an overhaul of the FEC,
and others."' Other proposals proffer ways to increase the "quality" of political
advertisements.' The feasibility and constitutionality of these solutions, many of

182

See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 1997, S. 25, 105th Cong. (1997) (hereinafter

Campaign Reform Act). See also, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, Creditingthe Voters: A New Beginning
for CampaignFinance, AM. PROSPECT, Spring 1993, at 71 (proposing a voucher system to replace
private financial support); Owen M. Fiss, Money and Politics, 97 COLuM L. REv. 2470 (1997)
(proposing mandatory public financing of electoral campaigns and criticizing Buckley); Richard
Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An Egalitarian/PublicChoice Defense of Campaign
Finance Vouchers, 84 CAL. L. REv. 1 (1996) (proposing a mandatory voucher system to replace the
current system of campaign finance); Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, The ConstitutionalImperative and
PracticalSuperiority of Democratically Financed Elections, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1160 (1994)
(proposing complete public financing of Congressional campaigns); Cass R. Sunstein, Political
Equalityand Unintended Consequences,94 COLum. L. REv. 1390, 1411-12 (1994) (proposing the use
of incentives to replace private support with public funding); Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 126,
1149-59; David R. Lagasse, Note, Undue Influence: CorporatePolitical Speech, Power and the
InitiativeProcess, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 1347, 1367 (1996) (arguing that the Court should repudiate its
key campaign finance holdings because its "free speech marketplace" model is bankrupt); Max Frankel,
It's the DemandStupid, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 2, 1997, at 24 (proposing abolishing television ads
and providing free television in its place); How to Cut the Cost of Politics,THE ECoNOMIST, Feb. 8,
1997, at 17-18 (proposing spending limits). For critiques of current and proposed campaign finance
regulation, see Lillian Bevier, CampaignFinanceReform: SpeciousArguments, IntractableDilemmas,
94 COLUM. L. REv. 1258 (1994); Bradley A. Smith, Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic
Consequences of Campaign FinanceReform, 105 YALE L.J. 1049 (1996).
183

See, e.g., Rebecca Arbogast, PoliticalAdvertising and the FirstAmendment: A Structural-

FunctionalAnalysisofProposedReform, 23 AKRON L. REV. 209, 223 (1989) (proposing that political
commercials be at least 90 seconds in length); Jack Winsbro, Misrepresentation in Political
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which would impact but not resolve the issue ad question,"' are complicated, and
are beyond the scope of this Article. Instead, this part will focus specifically on
redefining the standards framing issue advocacy to satisfy the Court's careful
balancing of two competing interests: permitting wide political expression, and

maintaining a legitimate, uncorrupted political campaign system.
A.

Using Context to Judge Express Advocacy
1.

Employing the "Reasonable Person" Standard

Replacing the "magic words" test with a context-based "reasonable person"
standard for "express advocacy" would allow the "express advocacy" prong to
distinguish properly between candidate advocacy and true issue advocacy. The

approach could take various forms, but at its heart wouldfind an ad to be express
advocacy when a reasonableperson,viewing the full advertisement in its context,
wouldJudge the centralmessage of the adto be calling upon him or her to vote for
or againsta particularcandidatein an upcoming election. Only those contextual
factors a reasonable viewer would likely be aware of- such as the timing of an
advertisement the use of commonly known campaign language or messages within
an advertisement, or an unusually public and partisan discussion about campaigns
by the group airing the advertisement that would strongly impact the
advertisement's perceived message - could be considered in judging the
advertisements themselves. Such an approach has been advocated and justified by
a handful of authorities.

Advertising: The Role of Legal Sanctions, Comment, 36 EMORY LAW J. 853, 895-915 (1987)
(proposing several means - including the use of defamation law, statutory requirements, and format
restrictions - to improve the quality of political advertising); Peter F. May, Note, State Regulation of
PoliticalBroadcastAdvertising: Stemming the Tide of Deceptive Negative Attacks, 72 B.U. L. REV.
179, 206 (1992) (proposing a state legislative framework to decrease negative advertising); Fred
Wertheimer, TVAD Wars: How to Reduce the FinancialandSocial Costs of Television Advertising
in Our PoliticalCampaigns (date unknown) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author)
(proposing several specific requirements, including free air time and a requirement that candidates
appear at the end of each ad).
184

Unless the -definitional problems of issue advocacy are addressed directly, other attempts at

reform - even broad ones - will in fact simply push more money through the "issue ad" loophole. For
instance, if the giving of "soft money" were banned entirely, corporations, unions and other large
givers could replace "soft money" donations to parties with large donations to non-profit groups
running campaign-related advertisements, or run such advertisements themselves. Although less direct
support of a candidate, the political payoff would be approximately the same, as would the level of
dollars being donated. Distortion, especially at the local level, could very well increase.
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In Furgatch,the Ninth Circuit outlined a clear and workable context-based
approach. Rather than looking for "magic words" as the only indication of express
advocacy, the court found that an ad can also be deemed express advocacy if "when
read as a whole, and with limited reference to external events, [it is] susceptible of
no other reasonable interpretation but as an exhortation to vote for or against a
specific candidate."' 85 The court suggested three components that would together
prove "express advocacy." First, an ad must convey a message that is
"unmistakable and unambiguous, suggestive of only one plausible meaning."' 86
Second, an ad must present a "clear plea for action," and not be "merely
'
Third, "it must be clear what action is advocated."' 88 The court
informative."187
emphasized that if "reasonable minds could differ" in interpreting speech in
question, then a court could not deem a message express advocacy.189 In
determining that "don't let him do it" advocated a clear, unambiguous action to vote
against President Carter, 190 the court not only examined the message itself, 9 ' but
looked at the timing of the ad, which, a week prior to the election, left little doubt
to the "reasonable" viewer what the suggested command was.9
After prevailing in Furgatch, the FEC altered its rules for "express
advocacy" to reflect the standards expounded upon in the decision. First, it listed
a set of phrases and examples of "express advocacy," expanding the specific "magic
words" standard outlined in Buckley."9 Some of these specific examples reflect the
185

Furgatch,807 F.2d 857, 864 (9th Cir. 1987).

186

Id.

187

Id.

188

Id.

189

Id.

190

Furgatch,807 F.2d at 864.

The court found that the ad failed to address any specific issue, and instead assaulted Carter
on personal issues. See id. at 865.
191

192

See id.

The FEC standard deemed ads to be express advocacy when they use words such as "vote
for the President," "re-elect your Congressman," "support the Democratic nominee," "cast your ballot
for the Republican challenger for U.S. Senate in Georgia," "Smith for Congress," when "Vote ProLife" or"Vote Pro-Choice" accompanies "a listing of clearly identified candidates described as Pro-life
193

or Pro-Choice, .

.

. 'defeat' accompanied by a picture of one or more candidate(s) ....

or

communications.., which in context can have no other reasonable meaning than to urge the election
or defeat of one or more clearly identified candidate(s), such as posters, bumper stickers,
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MCFL context-based interpretation. 94 Second; the FEC explicitly restated the
Furgatch holding. Express advocacy would include any communication that
"when taken as a whole and with limited reference to external events, such as the
proximity to the election, could only be interpreted by a reasonable person as
containing advocacy of the election or defeat of one or more clearly identified
candidate(s).... "1 95 Two factors would lead to such a conclusion. First, "the
electoral portion of the communication [must be] unmistakable, unambiguous, and
suggestive of only one meaning," and second, "reasonable minds [can] not differ
as to whether [an ad] encourages actions to elect or defeat one or more clearly
identified candidate(s) or encourages some other kind of action."'" 6

Finally, the "express advocacy" element of the most prominent campaign
finance reform bill before Congress in 1997 and 1998 - the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act of 1997 (better known as the McCain-Feingold Bill)'97 - called for a
"reasonable person" standard, but added several variables. First, the bill labeled

as "express advocacy" any communication which met a variant of the FEC's
broader "magic words" test, including if, in context, the ad would "have no
reasonable meaning other than to advocate the election or defeat of [one] or more
clearly identified candidates."'9 8 Alternatively, "express advocacy" would exist if
advertisement, etc. which say 'Nixon's the One,' 'Carter '76' 'Reagan/Bush' or 'Mondale!'

11 C.F.R.

§ 100.22(a) (1997).
194

See 11 C.F.R. § 100.22(b) (1997).

195

11 C.F.R. § 100.22(b)(1) (1997).

196

Id. The FEC defined "clearly identified" as those communications where a communication

identifies the candidate by "name, nickname, photograph or drawing," or an "unambiguous reference"
to his or her status, such as "the President" or "the incumbent." 11 C.F.R. § 100.17 (1997). For a
comprehensive defense of the FEC's standard, see Michael D. Leffeb, Note, A More Sensible
Approach to RegulatingIndependent Expenditures:Defending the Constitutionalityof the FEC'sNew
ExpressAdvocacy Standard,95 MICH. L. REV. 686 (1996).
Campaign Reform Act, supra note 182. In October, 1997, after a flurry of legislative
activity, a revised McCain-Feingold bill, already substantially narrowed from earlier versions, failed
to reach a floor vote in the Senate. See Eric Schmitt, Campaign FinanceMeasure Blocked in Two
Senate Votes; Main Foe Says Bill is 'Dead,'N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1997, at Al; Eric Schmitt, Overhaul
Bill StalledAgain in Senate in Same Ploys, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 10, 1997, at A21. It again failed to reach
the Senate floor in February, 1998. See Helen Dewar, CampaignFinanceBill Dies in Senate, WASH.
PosT, Feb. 27, 1998 at Al.
197

198

Campaign Reform Act, supranote 182, at § 201(b)(20)(A)(i). Specifically, the bill provided

that communications comprised "express advocacy" if they "contain[ed] a phrase such as 'vote for,'
're-elect,' 'support,' 'cast your ballot for,' '(name of candidate) for Congress,' 'vote against,' 'defeat,'
'reject,' or a campaign slogan or words that in context can have no reasonable meaning other than to
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a communication referred to one or more clearly identified candidates in a radio or

television advertisement within sixty days before a general election.199 Finally, the

bill would find "express advocacy" if any communication expressed "unmistakable
and unambiguous support for or opposition to [one] or more clearly identified

candidates when taken as a whole and with limited reference to external events,
such as proximity to an election. 20 0
2.

Effectively Distinguishing Between Issue and Candidate Advocacy

All three "reasonable person" standards discussed allow an analysis of an
advertisement's true impact by looking at an advertisement's broader context and
at specific relevant factors in addition to "magic words." This approach reflects the
reality that campaign advertisements need not possess "magic words" to be effective

vote-generating tools, and, more broadly, that "the meaning of words.., depends
heavily on context as well as the shared assumptions of speaker and listener.C' °I At
the same time, these standards establish a relatively high threshold for an ad to be
deemed campaign-centered, allowing true issue ads to continue unaffected. The

advocate the election or defeat of I or more clearly identified candidates." Id.
See idat § 201(b)(20)(A)(ii). In treating differently television and radio ads that precede an
election by sixty days or less, McCain-Feingold's time buffer sets too rigid a framework that may in
practice hamper the central aim of distinguishing issue advocacy from express advocacy, and
needlessly complicates the doctrine. Others have called for time buffers of different lengths. See
199

Allison Rittenhouse Hayward, Stalking the Elusive Express Advocacy Standard,10 J.L. & POL. 51,

86-94 (1993) (proposing a five-day time buffer within which all ads mentioning candidates would be
regarded as express advocacy). Rather than a firm cut-off date, the more effective approach remains
to adhere to those taken in Furgatch and by the FEC - looking at the timing of an advertisement as a
critical factor to be weighed in the contextual analysis. Perhaps more importantly, a rigid sixty-day
cutoff may be constitutionally infirm because it is not "narrowly tailored" to eliminate corruption. See
infra note 218 and accompanying text. For instance, ads within McCain-Feingold's sixty-day buffer
that pose little threat because they are indeed issue ads would be regulated, and perhaps prohibited.
Hayward's approach, on the other hand, would fail to end the threat of corruption posed by the millions
of dollars of ads airing in the months prior to her five-day buffer.
See Campaign Reform Act, supra note 182, at §201(b)(20)(A)(iii). McCain-Feingold
exempts ads that provide information "in an educational manner" about two or more candidates' voting
records. See id. at § 201 (b)(20)(B)(i).

200

Maine Right to Life Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 914 F. Supp. 8, 11 (D. Me. 1996),
aft'd, 98 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 52 (1997). Although striking down the FEC
standards in that case, the court conceded: "One does not need to use the explicit words 'vote for' or
their equivalent to communicate clearly the message that a particular candidate is to be elected." Id.
at 11.

201
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requirement that a reasonable viewer interpret an ad's central message as a clear and
unambiguous exhortation to vote for or against a certain candidate will exclude
even those ads that provide substantial and influential information about candidates
and elections for the central purpose of discussing an issue or policy.
Applying a "reasonable person" standard to 1996, many of that year's
campaign "issue ads" would in fact constitute "express advocacy." Given the very
explicit way in which it targeted individual candidates, most of the AFL-CIO's 1996
campaign would fall under a "reasonable person" standard of express advocacy, as
would countless other independently-run issue ads whose election-oriented appeals
were unmistakable. 2 So too would most of the DNC and RNC ads, which glossed
over issues in order to articulate forceful pronouncements about candidates. Those
ads falling more closely to the date of a primary or an election, even if they did not
expressly urge a vote, would likely be read by a "reasonable person" to be directing
such a vote.
What messages remain as protected issue ads? Ads which provide
information to voters about voting records without calling for any specific action
would continue as issue advocacy. Ads which take place months before an election,
discuss an issue on the Congressional agenda and a respective Congressman's
position, and urge voters to make their local Congressman aware of their feelings
on the issue, would also comprise issue advocacy.2 3 The health care ads of 1994
would still pass muster, as would some of the AFL-CIO's early ads regarding the
Contract with America.2° Legitimate issue ads might also include an environmental
advocacy group running ads describing the environmental records of lawmakers and
its own environmental view, or a pro-life group publicizing voting records while
espousing its pro-life view. Ads which primarily discuss issues, but refer to
202

Because of their issue focus and their distance from the elections, the AFL-CIO's 1995 ads

addressing the Contract with America provisions being considered in Congress could pass muster as

issue advocacy.
203

Although it explicitly rejected the FEC's context-based analysis, the Second Circuit's

analysis in FederalElection Comm "nv. CentralLong Island Tax Reform Immediately, 616 F.2d 45
(2d Cir. 1980), actually illustrates the appropriate consideration of relevant factors under such an
analysis. The court in that case found a leaflet to comprise issue advocacy, noting that although the
leaflet criticized the voting record of a local Congressman on the group's tax reform issues, "[t]here
is no reference anywhere in the [leaflet] to the Congressman's party, to whether he is running for reelection, to the existence of an election or the act of voting in any election; nor is there ... an
unambiguous statement in favor or against the election of [the Congressman]." Id. at 53. The court
concluded that without any reference to the candidate's opponent or his views, "a reader of the
pamphlet could not find any indication,'express or implied, of how [the group] would have him or her

vote." Id.
204

See supra, notes 1-3 & 65 and accompanying text.
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elections and candidates in an ambiguous way, and therefore carry less influence
on voters, would likely comprise issue advocacy, but would border express
advocacy. A court or the FEC might render a decision either way depending on the
specific circumstances and the perceived degree of ambiguity. 5
3.

Satisfying the Court's First Amendment Analysis

As Furgatchargues, a context-based "reasonable person" test is consistent
with the Court's purposes in establishing the "express advocacy" prong in Buckley,
and with its approach in MCFL. Although it is debatable whether the Buckley
Court's list of "magic words" was meant to be exhaustive or simply exemplary," 6
the Court's approach in MCFL favored the latter interpretation. The Court
suggested a less literal approach by looking at the broader purpose and message of
the advertisement itself to conclude that although "marginally less direct than 'Vote
for Smith,' . . . [the flyer] goes beyond issue discussion to express electoral
advocacy. ' 207 MCFL thus seemed to recognize, as the Furgatch court noted, that
Buckley's "magic words" do "not exhaust the capacity of the English language to
expressly advocate the election or defeat of a candidate. 2 8
Moreover, applying a reasonable person standard accomplishes the same
goal that Buckley was seeking in originally creating the "magic words" standard:
avoiding unconstitutional vagueness in construing the phrase "expenditure relative
to a clearly identified candidate." 0 9 In fact, the Court commonly utilizes contextbased reasonableness approaches to distinguish protected from unprotected
expression. Obscenity is judged in part by "whether 'the average person, applying
contemporary community standards,' would find that the work, taken as a whole,
205

A District of Columbia District Court's weighing of different factors regarding member

solicitation letters by the National Organization for Women (NOW) illustrates the appropriate process.
Finding that the central message of the letters was to expand NOW membership, that the numerous
appeals made in the letters - to '"joinNOW," to wear a button, to write a check and to put pressure on
various politicians - suggest "several plausible meanings," and that the letters made only a "few
passing references" to opponents of abortion (and that only two were seeking election in the year the
letters were distributed), the court found the letters to comprise issue advocacy under the Furgatchtest.
Federal Election Comm'n v. National Org. for Women, 713 F. Supp. 428, 434-35 (D.D.C. 1989).
The use of the words "such as" suggests the words listed were not as "magic" as has been
later held. Buckley, 424 U.S. 1, 44 (1976).

206

207

MCFL, 479 U.S. 243, 249 (1986).

208

Furgatch,807 F.2d 857, 863 (9th Cir. 1987).

209

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 41-42.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol100/iss1/10

44

Pepper: Recasting the Issue Ad: The Failure of the Court's Issue Advocacy
1997]

RECASTING THE ISSUE AD

appeals to the prurient interest." 210 Courts also judge "fighting words" by
context, 2 as they do-when considering obscenity over public airwaves.2 12 A
"reasonable person" test for issue ads as spelled out above, which would render ads
to be "express advocacy" only when campaign messages are unambiguous in their
advocacy for or against a candidate, is thus no less constitutionally infirm than
context-based standards used to distinguish other areas of protected speech.213
Finally, the "reasonable person" test for express advocacy passes the
broader strict scrutiny analysis - one which balances the fundamental right of

political expression with compelling government interests justifying regulation of
that expression - which the Court has applied from Buckley through Austin? 4 First,

210

Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (citation omitted). See also Roth v. United

States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957) (stating that the "community standards" test is "adequate to withstand
the charge of constitutional infirmity"); Furgatch,807 F.2d at 863. Miller also required two other
prongs to be met for speech to be deemed obscence, see Miller, 413 U.S. at 24, which the Court has
proclaimed to be an important factor saving the obscenity standard from unconstitutional vagueness.
See Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 117 S.Ct. 2329, 2332 (1997) (striking down provisions
of the Communications Decency Act). The standards proposed in Furgatch and by the FEC should
withstand even the Reno v. ACLU analysis, since - like Miller - they introduce additional criteria
beyond a simple "reasonable person" analysis.
211

See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942) (stating that the test for

"fighting words" using an interpretive standard of "men of common intelligence" is "narrowly drawn
and limited to define and punish specific conduct" and does not "contravenel- the Constitutional right
of free expression"). See generally Stephen W. Gard, Fighting Words as Free Speech, 58 WASH.
U.L.Q. 531, 536 (1980); Leffeb, supra note 196, at 715-16 (discussing the "context-sensitive
approach" used to analyze fighting words under the First Amendment).
212

See United States v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 744 (1978) ("[B]oth the content and

the context of speech are critical elements of First Amendment analysis.") (citing Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919)).
213

For a more detailed discussion of context-based standards in First Amendment law, see

Leffeb, supra note 196, at 709 (discussing standards applied to other areas of First Amendment
speech).
See ColoradoRepublican, 116, S. Ct. 2309, 2313 (1996) ("In [past FECA] cases, the Court
essentially weighed the First Amendment interest in permitting candidates (and their supporters) to
spend money to advance their political views, against a 'compelling' governmental interest in assuring
the electoral system's legitimacy, protecting it from the appearance and reality of corruption."); Austin,
494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990) (holding that the distortion wrought by corporate independent expenditures
comprises "a sufficiently compelling rationale to support its restriction"); MCFL, 479 U.S. at 256
("When a statutory provision burdens First Amendment rights, it must be justified by a compelling
state interest."); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66 ("'IT]here are governmental interests sufficiently important
to outweigh the possibility of infringement [of First Amendment rights], particularly when the 'free
functioning of our national institutions' is involved.") (citation omitted); Federal Election Comm'n v.
National Org. for Women, 713 F. Supp. 428 (D. D.C. 1989) ("The Supreme Court has upheld the
214
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the standard advances the compelling interests expounded in Buckley: eliminating
the opportunity for corruption and the perception of corruption that the "magic
words" standard has allowed.2" 5 Second, the standard serves the interest put forth
in Austin and MCFL: keeping corporate and union money from distorting

elections.2 6 Third, by compelling disclosure and reporting of advertisements that

are undoubtedly campaign related, the "reasonable person" standard would serve
the three compelling interests the Buckley Court found to justify disclosure and
reporting requirements.217
In addition to meeting these compelling interests, the standard is "narrowly
tailored" to pinpoint that speech which can be regulated under Buckley and later
doctrine. Because the new standard will "supply necessary premises that are
' it will more precisely
unexpressed but widely understood by readers or viewers, 218
gauge the true impact of advertisements. As a result, while pure issue advocacy even that which discusses candidates and their positions2" 9- will remain unaffected,
the new standard will more effectively encompass those advertisements that the
Court in Buckley and its progeny has upheld as within FECA's purview.220 As in
constitutional validity of [] restrictions on political speech only where the burden is justified by a
compelling state interest."). Cf Timmons v. Twin Cities AreaNew Party, 117 S. Ct. 1364, 1370 (1997)
("When deciding whether a[n] ... election law violates First and Fourteenth Amendment associational
rights, we weigh the 'character and magnitude' of the burden... the rule imposes on those rights
against the interests the [government] contends justify that burden, and consider the extent to which
the [government's] concerns make the burden necessary.") (citation omitted).
215

See supra text accompanying notes 144-45.

216

See supra notes 164-69 and accompanying text.

217

See supra text accompanying notes 142-43.

218

Furgatch,807 F.2d at 864.

219

As described in supranotes 203-205 and accompanying text, the standard would not impinge

upon discussion of candidates and their positions that might indirectly affect elections without
comprising "express advocacy." This would satisfy the Buckley protection of such speech: "Public
discussion of public issues which are also campaign issues readily and unavoidably draws in candidates
and their positions, their voting records and other official conduct. Discussions of those issues.., tend
naturally and inexorably to exert some influence on voting at elections." Buckley, 424 U.S. 1, 42 n.50
(1976).
220

For example, communication that is "unambiguously campaign related but would not

otherwise be reported because it takes the form of independent expenditures" is now captured by the
new standard, while before it was not. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 81. So too are advertisements that are
mere attempts to "avoid the disclosure requirements by routing financial support of candidates through
avenues not explicitly covered by the general provisions" of FECA. Id. at 76. Likewise, unlike the
current standard, a "reasonable person" standard would take into account the distinction Justice
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Austin and Buckley, because the standard is "precisely targeted to eliminate the
distortion" and the corrupting elements of expression, "while also allowing" broad
political expression by corporations, labor unions and advocacy groups 2 1 the
standard will have no more than a "reasonable and minimally restrictive" effect on
the exercise of fundamental First Amendment rights 22
Those courts that have ruled against a loosened "magic words" standard
exemplify the common failure among reform opponents to properly analyze
evolving campaign finance jurisprudence. First, they stubbornly rely on political
expression as the ultimate trump over all regulation of campaign communication,
even as the Court has recognized that certain compelling interests justify some

infringements upon such expression.t

Next, they overlook all but the broadest

declarations from the most recent and in-depth Court treatment of "express
advocacy" - MCFL - which in its more specific language provided for a broader
reading of the "magic words" test? 4 Finally, those holdings simply look beyond

Stevens described in Austin: that "there is a vast difference between lobbying and debating public
issues on the one hand, and political campaigns for election to public office on the other." Austin, 494
U.S. 652, 678 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring).
221

Austin, 494 U.S. at 660.

222

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 82. See also Turner Broad. Sys. v. Federal Communications Comm'n,

117 S. Ct. 1174, 1199 (1997) ("'[T]he essence of narrow tailoring is focus[ing] on the evils the
[Government] seeks to eliminate... [without] significantly restricting a substantial quantity of speech
that does not create the same evils."') (citation omitted).
223

Compare Faucher v. Federal Election Comm'n, 928 F.2d 468, 471 (1st Cir. 1991), cert.

denied, 502 U.S. 820 (1991) ("The FEC... has sought to restrain [political discussion] which the
Court in Buckley sought to protect. This we cannot allow.") and Maine Right to Life Comm. v.
Federal Election Comm'n, 914 F. Supp. 8, 12 (D.Me. 1996) ("FEC restriction of election activities [is]
not to be permitted to intrude in any way upon the public discussion of issues .... [The Court] at all
costs avoids restricting, in any way, discussion of public issues.") with cases cited supranote 214. In
this way, the Maine district court misses much of the point of Buckley and Austin when it concedes that
the "magic words" approach "does not give much recognition to the policy of the election statute to
keep corporate money from influencing elections . . ., but it does recognize the First Amendment
interest as the Court has defined it." MRTL, 914 F. Supp. at 12. In fact, the Court requires recognition
of both concerns.
224

Faucher,for example, cited MCFL only for the general proposition that "an expenditure

must constitute 'express advocacy' in order to be subject to [election law regulation]." Faucher, 928
F.2d at 470 (quoting MCFL, 479 U.S. at 249). The court failed to examine the next part of the MCFL
holding that found "express advocacy" without Buckley's "magic words," stating, "The fact that this
message is marginally less direct than 'Vote for Smith' does not change its essential nature." MCFL,
479 U.S. at 249. The Maine district court striking down the FEC's standard attempted to tackle this
language, arguing that the departure from "magic words" was "unsurprising" considering the clear link
between the phrase "vote pro-life" and a list of pro-life candidates. MRTL, 914 F. Supp. at 11 n.2. But
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other areas of current First Amendment doctrine when they claim that a "reasonable

person" standard unconstitutionally chills First Amendment rights.p Although an
austere freedom of political expression argument provides effective rhetoric in the

political world,"2 6 it flounders in the constitutional world of Buckley, MCFL and
Austin, where the rights of expression are balanced with other compelling
7
concerns.2

B.

Strengtheningthe CoordinationStandard

Like the "express advocacy" standard, the coordination prong - if is to
distinguish true issue advocacy from expenditures that are coordinated in a way that

threatens corruption and distortion - must map more closely with the reality of
this conclusion only accentuates MCFL's illustration that looking beyond "magic words" determines
a communication's meaning in a way that a rigid "magic words" analysis fails to. See MCFL, 479 U.S.
at 249.
M
Compare Faucher,928 F.2d at 471-72 ("[A context-based standard] offers no security for
free discussion. In these conditions it blankets with uncertainty whatever may be said. It compels the
speaker to hedge and trim.") with Furgatch,807 F.2d at 863 ("The doctrines of subversive speech,
'fighting words,' libel, and speech in the workplace and in public fora illustrate that when and where
speech takes place can determine its legal significance. In these instances, context is one of the crucial
factors making these kinds of speech regulable.") and supra notes 209-13 and accompanying text.
226

Senators vociferously used a First Amendment-trumps-all argument against both the "soft

money" ban and issue advocacy legislation in blocking the McCain-Feingold bill in October, 1997.
See, e.g., 143 CoNG. REC. S10339-05, S10343 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1997) (statement by Sen. McConnell)
("[McCain-Feingold's] issue advocacy provisions . . . are unconscionable assaults on the first
amendment right of all Americans."); 143 CONG. REc. S10719-05, S10721 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1997)
(statement of Sen. Roberts) (I"M]oney spent to express your views or the views of voters cannot be
regulated or banned without being at odds with the First Amendment."). But see 143 CONG. REC.
S10409-02, S10410 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1997) (statement of Sen. Levin) ("[T]he Supreme Court
explicitly held in Buckley that eliminating actual and apparent corruption of our electoral systemcorruption... was a compelling enough interest to justify Congress in imposing campaign contribution
limits, although such limits collide with unfettered first amendment rights of free expression and free
association.").
227

For discussions of the campaign finance doctrine in this direction see David Cole, First

Amendment Antitrust: The End of Laissez-Fairein Campaign Finance,9 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 236
(1991); Miriam Cytryn, Defining the Specter of Corruption: Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce, 57 BROOK. L. REv.903 (1991); Burt Neubome, Free Speech andEquality Cases Decided
by the UnitedStates Supreme CourtDuringthe September Term 1995-1996, 554 PI/LIT 857, 872-77
(1996); J.Patrick Bradley, Note, The Constitutionality of Restrictions on Corporate Political
Contributions,69 WASH. U. L.Q. 935 (1991); Prescott M. Lassman, Note, Breachingthe Fortress
Walls: CorporatePoliticalSpeech and Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Com., 78 VA. L. REV.759
(1992).
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political campaigns. In addition to simply mouthing a vague coordination standard,
the law must clearly spell out the meaning of coordination by prohibiting in specific
terms many of the ways which coordination can directly or subtly take place in
campaigns. Language from McCain-Feingold made a strong move in that direction,
outlining numerous specific circumstances that would constitute coordination.
First, the bill expressly defined as coordination a set of common forms of subtle yet
impbrtant coordination heretofore not recognized in the law. For independent
contributions, coordination would exist for any payment made "at the request or
suggestion of, or pursuant to any particular understanding with a candidate" or her
campaign, as well as in a number of other common scenarios.22 For example, the
legislation would find coordination in the following circumstances: if an
independent group undertakes "dissemination, distribution or republication" of
campaign material; if a group bases a communication on "information about a
candidate's plans, projects, or needs provided to the person making the payment by
the candidate or the candidate's agent"; or if an individual "making the payment"
has worked for that candidate's campaign during the election cycle either in a
formal or advisory position, or has retained services of a person or group who has
provided services for that candidate's campaign?" For political parties, the
legislation requires that parties provide either coordinated or independent
expenditures in support of particular candidates, but not both."0
By mapping more realistically with the subtle coordination that takes place
in political campaigns, these provisions - or, if they remain stillborn, similar toothinserting standards imposed by Congress or the courts in the future - would have
eliminated most of the instances of "issue advocacy" coordination seen in 1996.
Most importantly, all DNC and RNC advertisements in the Presidential race would
have fallen under the limitations required of coordinated expenditures. This
language would also have compelled parties to choose one of two routes in
supporting Congressional candidates, rather than following both coordinated and
"independent" tracks as they did in 1996. Finally, many of the practices that allow
advocacy groups, corporations and labor unions to "virtually coordinate" with
parties or candidates would now be prohibited. Perhaps most importantly, a revised
coordination standard would in clear terms reaffirm to the public and political
operatives the Court's emphasis that coordination, as much as "express advocacy,"
is not permitted in planning, funding or airing issue ads.

228

Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 1997, S. 25, 105th Cong. § 205(a)(1)(C)(i) (1997).

229

Id at § 205(a)(1)(C)(ii)-(ix).

230

See id. at § 204 (4)(A).
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The incidental restrictions placed upon speech by the bolstered coordination
prong described above would be justified. While an overbroad coordination
standard might unconstitutionally trample on speech," speech emerging from the

types of coordination described in McCain-Feingold is not protected from
restriction altogether. Rather, because of its intimate relationship to political

campaigns, speech that results from these forms of coordination impacts negatively
upon the compelling interests identified in Buckley and Austin, and thus can be

regulated constitutionally. 2 In identifying a distinct subset of circumstances that
indicate when candidates and those promulgating issue messages have interacted
to a degree that belies the Court's past confidence in the safety of independent

expression 3 and ultimately leads to the potential corruption alluded to in
Buckley,2 " a McCain-Feingold-type definition of coordination is "narrowly
tailored" to serve the Buckley and Austin compelling interests.
VI. CONCLUSION

Issue advertisements pose a unique challenge to the campaign finance
world. While they have the capacity to bring real issue discussions to the homes of
the American public, they also have the power to drown out locally-tailored
elections with Washington-driven rhetoric. At the same time that they seemingly
threaten less corruption because in theory they are not coordinated with candidates

231

The FEC voter guide regulation recently struck down by the First Circuit in Clifton v.

FederalElection Comm'n, 114 F.3d 1309 (lst Cir. 1997), for example, went one step too far in trying
to scale back coordination. That regulation barred any non-written "contact" between corporations and
labor organizations preparing voter guides and candidates "regarding the preparation, contents and
distribution of the voter guide." II C.F.R. § 114.4(c)(5)(i), (ii)(A). By barring even "a simple oral
inquiry... as to a candidate's position," the FEC rule unnecessarily trammeled core speech rights.
Clifton, 114 F.3d at 1312. Although Judge Bownes' dissent in Clifton proffers a strong argument in
defense of a tighter, narrowly tailored coordination standard which serves important compelling
interests, see icL at 1317-32, the regulation in question did not pass that muster. On the other hand,
McCain-Feingold avoids the infirmity of the FEC voter guide regulation by barring expenditures made
after a candidate has provided information on her "plans, projects, or needs." See Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act of 1997, S. 25, 105th Cong. § 205(a)(1)(C)(iii) (1997). While this standard prohibits
cooperation involving campaign strategy - cooperation which presents clear benefits to a candidate
and a strong likelihood of a quid pro quo arrangement - it does not regulate the communication of
policy questions, which may or may not benefit a candidate.
232

See supra text accompanying notes 144-45 & 164-69.

233

See supra note 13, and accompanying text.

234

See supra text accompanying notes 144-45.
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or do not expressly advocate the election of candidates, if they are coordinated or
do expressly advocate on behalf of a candidate, they provide a dangerously wide
loophole around other laws. And while they in one sense place special interest
lobbying into the public airwaves, healthily making the public the target of lobbying
rather than the politician, they can also instigate less detectable and possibly more
dangerous backroom political bargains by eliminating reporting and disclosure
requirements and re-introducing corporate money into the system. In short, while
issue ads potentially provide substantial improvements to America's elections, their
risks also loom large.
The law's lax treatment of issue advocacy - with a blunt "magic words"
standard and an ill-defined coordination standard - neglects this jeopardous
dichotomy. The 1996 elections dramatically highlighted the system's failure to
properly bound issue advertisements. Only by redefining each standard to
accurately account for the reality of political advertising and campaigning can
Congress and the Court frame issue advocacy in a way that improves rather than
cripples the system and that satisfies the Court's twin concerns for political
expression and an uncorrupted campaign system.
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